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ARTICLES
THE BANKER REMOVAL POWER
Da Lin & Lev Menand*
The Federal Reserve (“the Fed”) can remove bankers from office if
they violate the law, engage in unsafe or unsound practices, or breach
their fiduciary duties. The Fed, however, has used this power so rarely
that few even realize it exists. Although major U.S. banks have admitted
to repeated and flagrant lawbreaking in recent years, the Fed has never
removed a senior executive from one of these institutions.
This Article offers the first comprehensive account of the banker
removal power. It makes four contributions. First, drawing on a range
of primary sources, it recovers the power’s statutory foundations,
showing that Congress created the authority to better align the interests
of senior bankers and the public. Second, using a novel dataset
obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, it maps the
actual practice of banker removal—who is removed, how often removal
occurs, and for what reasons. It reveals that the Fed now uses the
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removal power mostly to prevent already-terminated, low-level
employees from working at other banks, even though Congress never
intended for the power to be used primarily in this way. Third,
harnessing corporate law theory, the Article defends the legislative
design. It argues that removal of senior bank executives for unsound
management practices is a critical component of effective bank
supervision, filling gaps left by regulatory rules and traditional
corporate governance measures. Finally, the Article concludes by
assessing obstacles to the use of the removal power against bank
leadership and suggesting policy responses.
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INTRODUCTION
Many observers have wondered why the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) did not prosecute more high-level executives following the 2008
financial crisis.1 Some argue that the paucity of indictments was the
product of soft corruption or the government’s fear of challenging deeppocketed defendants.2 Others attribute it to the absence of executive-level
criminal offenses: to them 2008 “was a bubble, not a fraud.”3 Missing has
been any discussion of why the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (“the Fed”)—the country’s leading bank supervisor—
failed to remove even a single top bank executive in connection with the
crisis. This civil remedy—the “banker removal power”—allows the Fed
to fire bank officers, directors, and employees for “unsafe or unsound
practices” and to prohibit them from working in banking.4 It was a core
part of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s financial reform agenda.5 And it was
designed precisely to allow the Fed to prevent an economic collapse of
the sort experienced in 2008.
The mystery deepens when one considers the remarkable breadth of
wrongdoing that has surfaced since the 2008 crisis. In the past twenty
years, America’s largest banks have settled hundreds of major lawsuits

1

See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, The Chickenshit Club: Why the Justice Department Fails to
Prosecute Executives xvi–xvii, at xxi (2017); Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have
No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 2014, at 4–8; William
D. Cohan, How the Bankers Stayed Out of Jail, Atlantic, Sept. 2015, at 20; Dorothy S. Lund
& Natasha Sarin, The Cost of Doing Business: Corporate Crime and Punishment Post-Crisis
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime
and Punishment: The Crisis of Underenforcement, at ix–x, 2–6, 13–14 (2020); Brandon L.
Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations 5, 18 (2014).
2
See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 4, 6 (critiquing the Justice Department’s rationales for not
prosecuting bank executives); Eisinger, supra note 1, at xx, 228, 233 (citing revolving door
practices at the Justice Department and the risk aversion of prosecutors). For other
commentary on prosecutors’ failure to charge executives in connection with the 2008 crisis,
see Coffee, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that the lack of prosecution “results chiefly from the
logistical mismatch between the government’s limited enforcement resources and the nearly
limitless capacity of the large corporation to resist and delay”); Garrett, supra note 1, at 6, 45–
80 (showing how public corporations were able to escape criminal prosecution through the
use of deferred prosecution agreements).
3
Coffee, supra note 1, at 4 (collecting sources).
4
12 U.S.C. § 1818(e). A brief definitional point: current law authorizes the Fed to remove
sitting bankers as well as to temporarily suspend them or permanently prohibit them from
working in banking (even if they have already been terminated). This Article uses the terms
“removal power” and “removal action” broadly to encompass all three sanctions.
5
See infra Section I.A.
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and paid an unprecedented $195 billion in fines and penalties.6 They have
admitted to fraud, bribery, money laundering, price fixing, bid rigging,
illegal kickbacks, discriminatory lending, and a host of other consumer
protection violations.7 In 2019, the DOJ labeled one trading desk at
JPMorgan Chase a “criminal enterprise.”8 Yet during this period, the Fed
did not remove a single senior executive of Chase or any other major U.S.
bank.
Instead, the Fed used its removal power mostly to exclude rogue lowlevel employees from the banking business for isolated instances of
misconduct. For example, in the early 2000s, SunTrust Bank fired Roslyn
Terry for stealing $21,200 while working as a teller.9 Following her
termination, the Fed banned Terry from working at a bank ever again.10
The Fed’s ban had no impact on SunTrust, its management, or its
practices, nor was it intended to. Primarily, it signaled Terry’s lack of
fitness to other banks and potential employers.
Terry’s case—and the lack of executive removals in recent years—was
not always the norm. In the early 1990s, the Fed used its removal power
primarily against bank leadership. Between 1989 and 1993—the first five
years for which enforcement data is publicly available—over 75% of
domestic removal orders issued by the Fed targeted presidents, chief
executive officers, board chairmen, and board directors. But as the
banking industry consolidated in the subsequent decade, the Fed’s
enforcement focus shifted toward rank-and-file workers, especially those
who had already been fired by their employers and no longer worked at a
bank. Over the five years ending in 2019, 72% of domestic removal
actions by the Fed barred low- and mid-level employees who had already
been terminated.11
6
See, e.g., Laura Noonan, US Banks Rack Up $200bn in Fines and Penalties over 20 Years,
Fin. Times (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/989035f3-767a-43c2-b12e2f6c0be0aa6b [https://perma.cc/R29R-AQT6].
7
See Better Markets, Wall Street’s Crime Spree 1998–2020: 395 Major Legal Actions and
$195+ Billion in Fines and Settlements over the Last 20 Years, at 2 (Jan. 13, 2021).
8
Tom Schoenberg & David Voreacos, JPMorgan’s Metals Desk Was a Criminal Enterprise,
U.S. Says, Bloomberg (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0916/jpmorgan-s-metals-desk-was-a-criminal-enterprise-u-s-says
[https://perma.cc/FW3CQC99].
9
Prohibition Ord., Roslyn Y. Terry, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 08-016-EI (Aug. 29, 2008).
10
Id.
11
See Compiled Data on Removal Orders Completed by the Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Rsrv. Sys. (on file with authors) [hereinafter Removal Orders].
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Scholars and policymakers have failed to notice this change or
appreciate its significance.12 There has been little effort to date to explain
why the Fed has a removal power or to consider how the Fed should use
it.13 The absence of the power in the literature is particularly surprising
given the salience and frequency of lawbreaking by banks and the ensuing
public outrage toward bank executives.14
This Article seeks to give the banker removal power a seat back at the
table. It makes four contributions. The first is historical. Through original
research, Part I reconstructs the statutory development of the banker
removal power. It highlights the power’s animating conception of bank
executives as public fiduciaries and reveals that banker removal is not just
another remedial tool in the Fed’s toolkit. Removal is the legal foundation
for modern bank supervision, a distinctive form of government oversight
that proceeds through continuous, confidential engagement between
bankers and government officials. Policymakers first proposed the power
in the late nineteenth century as a way to enhance the government’s
supervisory control of banks. And Congress granted the Fed the power in
1933 in an effort to preserve an institutional arrangement for expanding
the money supply that relies on deposit money issued by privately run

12
There is little scholarship on the removal power, and the scholarship that does exist is
dated. See Joseph M. Korff, Banking, 8 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 599, 600 (1967)
(describing the effect of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 on the removal
power); Robert J. Basil, Suspension and Removal of Bank Officials Under the Financial
Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), 18 J. Legis. 1, 2
(1991) (discussing the effect of recent amendments on removal actions from the perspective
of the private bar). One exception is work by Professor Heidi Schooner who considers removal
in the context of disparate enforcement policies for large and small banks. See Heidi Mandanis
Schooner, Big Bank Boards: The Case for Heightened Administrative Enforcement, 68 Ala.
L. Rev. 1011, 1013, 1024–27 (2017).
13
The power is similarly neglected by corporate governance scholars and unknown to the
voluminous administrative law literature focused on the President’s power to remove
independent agency heads. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Presidential
Review: The President’s Statutory Authority over Independent Agencies, 109 Geo. L.J. 637
(2021); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Political Economy of the Removal Power, 134 Harv. L. Rev.
352, 354 (2020); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L.J.
1836, 1880–81 (2015); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent
Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L. Rev. 769, 772 (2013); Lawrence Lessig &
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 110 (1994).
14
See, e.g., Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Ranking Member, Senate Subcomm. on Fin. Inst.
& Consumer Prot., to Janet Yellen, Chair, Fed. Rsrv. Bd. of Governors (June 19, 2017)
[hereinafter Letter from Elizabeth Warren].
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banks.15 Congress hoped that if the Fed had the power to remove
untrustworthy bank leaders, banks would heed informal supervisory
directives and better serve public as well as private interests.16
In 1966, Congress gave the banking agencies a further tool to
strengthen supervision—the cease-and-desist order—and rolled back
removal, limiting it to situations involving “dishonesty.”17 In 1978,
concerned by evidence of increasing executive malfeasance, Congress
reversed course, allowing for removal even in cases not involving
dishonesty.18 Removals accelerated, and in the wake of hundreds of costly
bank failures in the late 1980s, Congress further expanded the removal
power in 1989. Today, the power exists at its broadest scope. Any
institution-affiliated party is subject to sanction; a removal may result in
a lifetime prohibition from banking; and willful or continuing “unsafe or
unsound” conduct, even in the absence of fraud, suffices to justify
enforcement.
15
See Lev Menand, Why Supervise Banks? The Foundations of the American Monetary
Settlement, 74 Vand. L. Rev. 951, 958, 1004 (2021).
16
Bank supervision has been the subject of a surge of recent scholarly attention. See, e.g.,
id.; Daniel K. Tarullo, Bank Supervision and Administrative Law, Colum. Bus. L. Rev.
(forthcoming)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
authors),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3743404
[https://perma.cc/ZY2P3EXR]; see also Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Supervision: A Legal Scholarship Review
(forthcoming)
(U.
Ala.
Legal
Stud.,
Research
Paper
No.
2627472),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3777580
[https://perma.cc/57527XHC]; Event Overview Bank Supervision: Past, Present, and Future, Fed. Rsrv. Bd. of
Governors,
Wharton
Sch.
&
Harv.
L.
Sch.
(Dec.
11,
2020),
https://events.stlouisfed.org/event/67aec69c-628d-459d-8366-466979e3f8af/summary; Lev
Menand, Too Big to Supervise: The Rise of Financial Conglomerates and the Decline of
Discretionary Oversight in Banking, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 1527 (2018); Julie Andersen Hill,
When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong: Financial Institution Appeals of Material Supervisory
Determinations, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1101, 1105 (2015). This growth is due in part to an
active debate inside and outside the government over supervision’s legitimacy as a mode of
administrative governance. See Jeremy Kress, Notice & Comment, The War on Bank
Supervision, Yale J. Regul. (Dec. 18, 2020); Peter Conti-Brown & Nicholas R. Parrillo,
Supervision, Stress Tests, and the Administrative Procedure Act (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors); Randal Quarles, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Remarks at the “Law and Macroeconomics” Conference at Georgetown University Law
Center: Law and Macroeconomics: The Global Evolution of Macroprudential Regulation 12
(Sept. 27, 2019). Part I of this Article introduces removal law to the supervision literature and
adds to the debate by recovering a portion of supervision’s legal foundations. It reveals, among
other things, that removal law treats banks as public franchises, complicating contemporary
efforts by critics of bank supervision to characterize banks as purely private enterprises.
17
See infra Section II.B.
18
See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183, § 904 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1818).
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This Article’s second contribution is analytic, picking up the story after
1989 and bringing it to the present. Part II introduces a novel dataset on
the Fed’s removal actions between 1989 and 2019 using public
information as well as orders obtained through Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”) requests.19 Details about the individuals sanctioned and
their wrongdoing were hand collected from case files and
contemporaneous news accounts and matched with bank characteristics.
The data reveal that the Fed uses its removal power sparingly,
averaging 7.2 actions per year over the past 31 years. Even less common
are Fed removals of sitting bank employees; 91% of Fed removal orders
ban people who are no longer working at banks, blocking them from
returning in the future. More notably, since the late 1990s, the Fed has
deployed its power, now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e), primarily
against rank-and-file workers for activities already subject to criminal
penalties. For example, the most common reason for removal during this
period was embezzlement or misuse of funds. In only three instances has
the Fed used its removal power to address poor oversight and reckless
management, and two of these instances involved employees of the same
bank who jointly supervised a rogue trader. The Fed’s other 187 removal
actions all targeted individuals who directly participated in unlawful
activities.20
The Article’s third contribution is theoretical. Part III argues that a
credible threat of removal against senior bank executives for unsound
management practices is an indispensable component of contemporary
bank supervision. Traditional corporate governance measures, which
focus on enhancing the accountability of senior bankers to shareholders,
will not eliminate incentives for banks to engage in socially harmful risk
taking. Shareholders have strong incentives to exploit banks’ government
backstopping and extract wealth from the public by encouraging
investment in risky assets. No matter how carefully constructed,
regulatory rules and statutory provisions that directly restrict the menu of
19

The Fed is not the only bank regulator with the power to remove bank employees and
affiliates. Little is currently known about how the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) use their parallel power—
whom they remove and for what conduct. Given the breadth of their supervisory jurisdictions,
their practices are worthy of future study.
20
These results align with qualitative accounts of the Fed’s supervisory rollback in the late
1990s and early 2000s. See, e.g., Menand, supra note 16, at 1541, 1574. They also provide
empirical evidence for concerns about the government’s enforcement posture toward senior
corporate executives. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 2.
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choices available to banks are backward looking, crude, and inevitably
incomplete.21
This Article therefore joins a growing body of scholarship in
recognizing that corporate governance reforms and prudential regulatory
rules have limited capacity to curb unsafe bank behavior.22 But contrary
to the emerging view, we do not conclude from this diagnosis that entirely
new regulatory methods are needed.23 Instead, we argue that regulators
21
We use Dan Tarullo’s term “regulatory rules” to describe strictures promulgated through
notice-and-comment in order to differentiate them from “regulation,” which we use to refer to
all manner of government oversight. See Tarullo, supra note 16.
22
See infra Sections III.A–B; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The
Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 Fed. Rsrv. Bank N.Y. Econ. Pol’y Rev. 91, 97–99 (2003)
(observing that banks have “special corporate governance problems” that “weaken the case
for making shareholders the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties”); Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 Geo. L.J. 247, 255–61 (2010) (observing
the same problem and detailing how features of modern banking organizations heightened the
basic moral hazard problems); Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and
Public Duty, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 4 (2016) (describing the “misalignment” between
shareholders’ interests and the public’s interest in systemically important firms); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory
Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 807 (2011) (noting that “the more
‘shareholder friendly’ the firm’s corporate governance system, the less attention is likely to
be paid to externalities, and the greater the exposure to volatility and systemic risk”). See
generally Dan Awrey & Kathryn Judge, Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short, 61
B.C. L. Rev. 2295, 2299–300 (2020) (summarizing the literature on “why financial regulation
so often falls short” and contributing additional explanations).
23
For examples of this emerging view, see Schwarcz, supra note 22, at 23–44 (arguing that
“managers should have a public governance duty not to engage their firms in excessive risktaking that leads to [systemic] externalities”); Macey & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 92
(contending that “directors and officers of banks should be charged with a heightened duty to
ensure the safety and soundness of these enterprises[, which] . . . should not run exclusively
to shareholders”); Coffee, supra note 22, at 834–35 (proposing a contingent capital mechanism
that would, in part, serve the function of giving creditors’ voting powers once the bank is in
the “vicinity of insolvency”); John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and
Shareholder Value, 6 J. Legal Analysis 35, 67–70 (2014) (arguing that Caremark liability for
oversight failure should be “applied in wider circumstances and to a higher standard” in banks
and other systemically important financial firms); Saule T. Omarova, Bank Governance and
Systemic Stability: The “Golden Share” Approach, 68 Ala. L. Rev. 1029, 1032, 1043–51
(2017) (arguing for a “golden share” regime that would “giv[e] the federal government a seat
on the board of each systemically important banking organization”); Saule T. Omarova,
Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation,
37 J. Corp. L. 621, 658–69 (2012) [hereinafter Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and
Guardians] (proposing the creation of a Public Interest Council that would function to
“represent the public interest in preserving financial stability and minimizing systemic risk”);
Ross Levine, The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent
Crisis, 12 Int’l Rev. Fin. 39, 41–42 (2012) (proposing a new regulatory entity “to act as the
public’s sentry over ﬁnancial policies and to help compel ﬁnancial regulators to act in the
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already have a tool that would allow them to reorient bank managers’
incentives toward the public interest. Section 1818(e) can serve this role.
A credible threat of removal permits the Fed to keep senior executives
and directors in line by prioritizing its judgment over that of private
shareholders in order to improve the safety of the banking system as a
whole. It also bolsters ongoing government supervision of banks by
ensuring that Fed officials do not need to continue to rely on bank
managers whom they no longer trust.
The Article’s final contribution is prescriptive. The removal power has
failed to achieve its full potential to improve bank governance because
the Fed rarely removes senior bankers. Part IV examines how the current
statutory design enables this trend and recommends changes. In
particular, it shows that the removal power was last updated before the
emergence of large financial conglomerates and thus is out of sync with
the reality of modern banking. Bank executives now serve in oversight,
rather than operational, roles. Because the removal power relies on a
single culpability standard that applies in blanket fashion to all bankers
along the corporate hierarchy, regardless of their varied roles and
responsibilities, it substantially raises the difficulty of removing bank
leadership relative to lower-level subordinates. Accordingly, Part IV
argues that Congress should expressly recognize oversight failure as a
removal ground. In addition, the Fed should revise its practice of
imposing uniform removal terms for all cases, instead varying the scope
and duration of removal according to the type of wrongdoing at issue.
Banker removal can be a powerful tool for strengthening bank
governance. It can even work silently, with few if any formal actions. But
the law only works if bankers believe they will be removed for breaking
the law or jeopardizing the public’s interest in a safe and sound banking
system. The evidence suggests that, at the most senior levels of the
banking industry, removal has ceased to fulfill this function. By providing
a comprehensive account of the removal power in theory and practice,
this Article takes a first step toward its renewal.
public interest, regardless of their private interests”); see also Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the Association of American Law Schools
Midyear Meeting: Corporate Governance and Prudential Regulation 11–17 (June 9, 2014),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20140609a.htm
[https://perma.cc/9QMX-A32B] (proposing mechanisms to align corporate governance at
banks with public objectives, including: changing the incentives of decision makers;
restricting dividends under certain circumstances; reforming the institutions and processes of
corporate decision making; and amending the fiduciary duties of bank boards).
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I. STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS
This Part reconstructs the statutory foundations of the banker removal
power. First, it shows how Congress created the power in 1933 to
strengthen bank supervision and preserve the American Monetary
Settlement, an arrangement in which privately owned banks perform the
public function of expanding the money supply.24 Second, it examines
how Congress revisited removal law after major banking crises in 1966,
1978, and 1989, changing whom the Fed may remove, the consequences
of removal, and the extent of the Fed’s discretion. Throughout this period,
the removal power’s intended function remained constant: to buttress
informal bank oversight, check dangerous bank executives, and ensure
that banks do not maximize private profits at the public’s expense.
A. The Origins of Removal and the Banking Act of 1933
To subject banks to a greater degree of public control, Congress in 1933
authorized the Fed to remove bank officers and directors. Like deposit
insurance, another policy adopted during the Great Depression, the idea
of empowering government agencies to fire bad bankers had been
circulating in policy circles for decades. But it took two crises and the
triumph of the progressive movement to add the power to the U.S. Code.
1. The Select Committee on Failed National Banks
Many of the core provisions of contemporary U.S. banking law date to
the Civil War era when Congress created the national banking system.
The system is composed of hundreds of “national banks,” each separately
capitalized and chartered by a quasi-independent bureau in the Treasury
Department known as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”).25
Collectively, national banks create the bulk of the nation’s money
supply, issuing liabilities known as deposits.26 Yet despite the critical role
national banks play in monetary policy, they are run by officers and
directors selected by private shareholders. To prevent inflation and
24
See Menand, supra note 15, at 951 (defining the American Monetary Settlement and
examining its features).
25
See Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, Federal Corporate Law and the Business of Banking,
88 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3702511 [https://perma.cc/GYK9-BKPS].
26
Id. (manuscript at 22–23).
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politicized credit provisioning, Congress expressly withheld the power to
appoint national bank executives from government officials such as the
President. In this way the National Bank of Act of 1864 follows statutes
from 1791 and 1816 incorporating the First and Second Banks of the
United States.27
The use of private shareholders to pursue a public imperative—
monetary expansion—was controversial from the start. But it became
especially salient when national banks collapsed, jeopardizing the savings
of ordinary households and shrinking the money supply. It is perhaps
unsurprising, then, that it was in the wake of the worst year to date for the
national banking system that the idea of empowering government
officials to fire bad bankers first surfaced at the federal level.
In 1891, twenty-five national banks failed. Amidst the outcry, the
Senate appointed a select committee to investigate the failures and
determine “whether the existing provisions of the laws relative to national
banks . . . furnish[ed] sufficient protection to the depositors and other
creditors and to the stockholders [in such institutions].”28 The
investigators concluded that the failures were a product of excessive
lending and reckless management. Although the involvement of private
shareholders in running national banks had helped avoid inflation and
government corruption, it had also created its own pathologies.
“[E]xcessive overloans to officers and stockholders”29 was a particular
problem.30 For example, the Committee found that the president of
Maverick National Bank lent himself $1.3 million against a capital of just
$400,000, routing smaller loans through clerks, pages, and minors.31 The
Committee further determined that the Comptroller had been aware of
Maverick’s tendency to exceed loan limits for years and that his office
had repeatedly directed the bank to reduce its overloans.32 The bank’s
executives, however, had ignored the Comptroller’s demands. Worse,
Maverick’s intransigence was not an isolated incident. As the Comptroller
put it, “bank officers usually courteously reply that they will comply [with
27

Id. (manuscript at 20). When Congress rechartered the bank in 1816, it permitted the
President to appoint five of the bank’s twenty-five directors. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 13, at 30 (describing the Second Bank of the United States as “the first truly independent
agency in the republic’s history”). The bank’s charter expired in 1836.
28
S. Rep. No. 1286, at I (1893).
29
Id. at XXIV.
30
Id. at XXIV, 13.
31
Id. at XIII, XV–XVIII.
32
Id. at XXI–XXII.
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requests to reduce overloans], and pay no attention to the subject
thereafter.”33 The problem was that the “penalty for [improper lending]—
the commencement of an action . . . to forfeit the bank’s charter—[wa]s
so severe as to render it nugatory.”34 Moreover, the Committee noted that
many bank failures can be “traced to . . . evasions of the law which
technically do not amount to unlawful loans,” even though they violate
the spirit of the law, further complicating the ability of the Comptroller to
protect the public interest.35
The Committee proposed a solution: “many [bank] failures,” it argued,
“could [be] avoided if the system”36 were better designed. Rather than
limit the Comptroller’s remedial authority to charter forfeiture, the
Committee recommended that Congress directly empower the
Comptroller “to remove bank officials persistently guilty of [violating the
banking laws].”37 In a parallel report, the sitting Comptroller, A. Barton
Hepburn, echoed the Committee’s conclusion. According to Hepburn, the
national banking system would be more efficient if the government had
more leverage over bank officers and directors:
I think this whole difficulty, as well as others that arise, might be
substantially reached if the Comptroller, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, were given power, after a hearing, to remove
bank officers and directors for violations of law, leaving the vacancy to
be filled in the regular way. It is a power that would be seldom
exercised. The existence of the power would deter many who now keep
the letter, only to violate the spirit of the law.38

33

Id. at XXII.
U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., No. 1565, Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 42
(1892) [hereinafter Ann. Rep. of the Comptroller of the Currency].
35
S. Rep. No. 1286, at III (1893) (quoting the Comptroller).
36
Id. at II.
37
Id. at XXIV–XXV. Similar provisions requiring official action against insolvent banks
had been adopted by the states. California even had a judicial removal power for managers of
insolvent banks. See James H. Deering, General Laws of California as Amended up to the End
of the Session of 1899, An Act Creating a Board of Bank Commissioners, and Proscribing
Their Duties and Powers § 11 (1899) (allowing courts to remove and replace officers “guilty
of fraud, malversation, or criminal carelessness or negligence” and those that “are not the
proper persons to be intrusted with the closing of the affairs and business of such corporation
in the interest of the depositors, creditors, and stockholders thereof”).
38
Ann. Rep. of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 34, at 43. Hepburn was not the
first bank supervisor to seek the power. See, e.g., Report of the Board of Bank Commissioners
of the State of California to the Legislature 29 (1880).
34
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Although the chairman of the committee, Senator William Chandler,
introduced a bill that would have given the Comptroller a removal power,
the bill did not become law.39
Chandler’s idea, however, lived on. In the years that followed, many
of Hepburn’s successors lobbied Congress for removal authority. In 1893,
for example, Comptroller James H. Eckels argued that “the powers now
vested in the Comptroller do not accomplish the result that they otherwise
would if the law permitted the removal of officers and directors for
misconduct in office.” According to Eckels, “[m]any banks would be
saved from embarrassment, creditors from loss, and shareholders from
assessments if the Comptroller, upon learning of the misconduct of those
charged with the management of a bank, could take positive action in the
premises.”40 What Eckels and Hepburn were looking for was the sort of
safeguard Congress had placed just a few years earlier on the Interstate
Commerce Commission (“ICC”), the first modern independent agency:
the power to ensure through the exercise of limited purpose removal
authority that institutions shielded from politics nonetheless stayed true
to their public purpose.41
A generation later, with independent agencies on the rise, and limited
purpose removal provisions increasingly common, John Skelton
Williams, a progressive reformer appointed by President Woodrow
Wilson, renewed Chandler’s call to augment the Comptroller’s authority.
In 1915,42 1917,43 and 1918,44 Williams asked Congress to amend the
National Bank Act. As Williams put it:
For many of the offenses indicated [in the Act] the only penalty which
can be enforced by the Comptroller’s office is the forfeiture of the
bank’s charter by suit in the United States court. This [remedy] in many

39

S. 3730, 52d Cong. § 3 (reported favorably Feb. 11, 1893); S. Rep. No. 1286, at XXV
(1893).
40
U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 20–21 (1893).
Eckels repeated the recommendation in 1894. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Ann. Rep. of the
Comptroller of the Currency 31 (1894).
41
See Jane Manners & Lev Menand, The Three Permissions: Presidential Removal and the
Statutory Limits on Agency Independence, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7, 52–53 (2021).
42
U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., No. 2766, Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 39
(1915).
43
U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., No. 2802, Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 19
(1917).
44
U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., No. 2827, Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 75
(1918).
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cases would prove a great hardship to innocent stockholders and
depositors, and can only be resorted to with much reluctance by this
office.45

Just as shutting down the ICC would hardly have been the best way to
address malfeasant ICC commissioners, Williams thought that shutting
down an entire banking franchise because of reckless leadership would
unduly hamper the public welfare. Strict monitoring combined with
usable sanctions would deter the sort of self-dealing that sunk many banks
and would stop bank executives from exploiting their ability to expand
the money supply for private gain.
2. The New Deal Compromise
But Congress never acted. Instead, it loosened restrictions on national
banks and allowed a competing group of state-chartered banks to rise up
and threaten the stability of the entire monetary architecture. In 1913,
Congress took a major step toward addressing the growing state banking
system and enhancing public control over national banks as well: it
created the Federal Reserve, including twelve Federal Reserve Banks and
a Board in Washington. But the Fed failed to tame the growing mass of
state banks. Nor was it able to avert a “competition in laxity” between the
Comptroller and state authorities.46
Accordingly, the second of the two crises mentioned above—the crisis
of 1932–33—was far more severe. By the time President Roosevelt took
office in March 1933, thousands of banks had failed, plunging the country
into a Great Depression.47 The very arrangement, established during the
Civil War, of banks run by private shareholders subject to public
oversight came into question. As one official put it: “Either the bankers
of this country will realize that they are guardians of the moneys
committed to their charge and will conduct their business accordingly, or
banking will cease to be a private enterprise and will become a purely
governmental function.”48
45
U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., No. 2735, Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency
16–17 (1914).
46
Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Nineteenth Annual Report 236, 248 (1932).
47
Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the
Great Depression, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 257, 259 (June 1983) (stating that “the number of banks
operating at the end of 1933 was only just above half the number that existed in 1929”).
48
Albert C. Agnew, Some Thoughts on the Future of American Banking, 14 Cal. Banker
193, 194 (June 1933).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

The Banker Removal Power

15

“Nationalization” of deposit issue was not a fringe view. Many of
Roosevelt’s advisors thought that the federal government should reclaim
public control over the money supply. For example, Rex Tugwell, an
influential economist in the President’s “Brain Trust,” argued that the
government would be a more effective banker than the profit-seeking
business community.49 Eight professors at the University of Chicago
proposed effectively eliminating banks’ monetary powers by requiring
them to back all their deposits with government-issued cash. As the
economist Henry Simons put it, the “Chicago Plan” would secure the
“abolition of private credit as an element in the circulating media” and
concentrate “complete and direct control over the quantity of [money] in
the hands of the central monetary authority.”50
But President Roosevelt had a conservative instinct—he thought that
the problem with the banking system was not with private outsourcing,
per se, but with poor official sector oversight. In Roosevelt’s view, the
OCC and the Fed had failed to adequately check aggressive risk taking by
bankers. As Roosevelt explained in his first fireside chat: “We had a bad
banking situation. Some of our bankers had shown themselves either
incompetent or dishonest in their handling of the people’s funds. They
had used the money entrusted to them in speculations and unwise
loans.”51 Enhanced government supervision of banking was Roosevelt’s
preferred solution.52
The New Deal Congress followed Roosevelt’s lead. In 1933, it
bolstered bank supervision in two ways. First, it established the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to explicitly backstop and
oversee bank deposit money, importantly including deposit money issued
by state-chartered banks. Second, it added the banker removal power to
the Fed’s arsenal.53
Its goal in adding the removal power was to avert bank failures and
depositor losses by aligning the interests of bankers with the interests of
the public. Congress was particularly concerned (just as Senator Chandler
49

Susan Estabrook Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, at 166–67 (1973).
Ronnie J. Phillips, The Chicago Plan & New Deal Banking Reform 50 (1995).
51
President Roosevelt Delivers His First “Fireside Chat,” March 12, 1933, reprinted in 4
Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the United States 2711 (Herman E. Krooss
ed., 1969).
52
See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Looking Forward 227 (1933) (“The events of the past three
years prove that the supervision of national banks for the protection of depositors has been
ineffective. I propose much more rigid supervision.”).
53
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73–66, §§ 8, 30, 48 Stat. 162.
50
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had been forty years earlier) that bankers had been evading the rules in
pursuit of excess profits, that government examiners had learned of these
evasions, and that the banking agencies had been unable to correct the
problems. As one banker explained to the Senate Banking Committee,
I cannot emphasize [the removal provision] too strongly, because it is
familiar to every member of this committee that banks have gone along
with mismanagement and the public has known about it, and the
Comptroller of the Currency has known about it, and the
superintendents of State banks have known about it and they have
criticized it. But the way to get [the bank managers] out has not been
plain, and I think that a way ought to be made to get them out . . . .54

Senator Carter Glass from Virginia emphasized this rationale:
[The comptroller] had knowledge that [the large banks that failed and
triggered a collapse of the banking system in 1932] were engaged in
irregular and unsound if not actually illicit business five years before
the failure came; that the files of the comptroller’s office were replete
with admonitory letters, with letters severely protesting against the
practices in those banks over a period of years; but they did not close
up the banks because of this reluctance . . . to resort to that severe
proceeding.55

Legislators in the House held a similar view.56

54

A Bill to Provide for the Safer and More Effective Use of the Assets of Federal Reserve
Banks and of National Banking Associations, to Regulate Interbank Control, to Prevent the
Undue Diversion of Funds into Speculative Operations, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on
S. 4115 Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong. 320 (Mar. 1932)
(statement of John K. Ottley, President of the First National Bank of Atlanta, Georgia).
55
75 Cong. Rec. 9890 (1932) (statement of Sen. Carter Glass).
The comptroller has great reluctance to apply the drastic condemnation [of revoking a
bank’s charter]. . . . So we have embodied in the bill a provision which authorizes the
comptroller . . . when a bank is found in irregular and illicit and unsound practices
which it either fails or refuses to correct, to summon these bank officials to a court of
inquiry and give them a thorough hearing and, if the facts sufficiently warrant it, to
suspend or dismiss the officers of the bank.
Id.
56
See, e.g., 77 Cong. Rec. 3916 (1933) (statement of Rep. Robert Luce):
[Section 30] is, in my judgment, the best thing in the whole bill. It is pretty nearly the
only provision in the whole bill that puts any teeth into existing law. The reasons why
we have had so many bank failures are not easy to determine, but we know, at least,
that one reason has been the inability of the Comptroller of the Currency to compel
banks to conduct their business according to sound methods and on right principles.
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The resulting law—Section 30 of the Banking Act of 1933—
empowered the Comptroller and officials at the regional Federal Reserve
banks to refer instances of continued legal “violations” or “unsafe or
unsound practices” to the Fed’s Board and the Board to remove bank
officers and directors engaged in such conduct following notice and a
hearing. No provision was made for judicial review. The Act imposed
strict secrecy on any removal order and related findings of fact,
presumably to preserve the franchise value of the bank. It also applied
criminal penalties to any person who participated in “any manner in the
management of such bank” following removal.57
B. 1933–1966: From Resistance to Reform
Section 30 was rarely used in the thirty years that followed. The
Comptroller soured on the power, seeing it as ineffective and
cumbersome, and perhaps resenting the way that it subordinated the
OCC’s supervisory authority to the Fed. So, in 1966, Congress made a
series of changes to the removal power: expanding its scope to cover
suspensions and prohibitions and restricting its applicability to cases
involving personal dishonesty.
1. Goliath’s Sword
It is difficult to determine how profoundly removal authority changed
the dynamic between bank executives and bank supervisors. What we do
know is that the Fed invoked Section 30 only a handful of times between
1933 and 1966, and that it viewed invocation of the power as a last resort
only to be used on great occasions.58
57
The Banking Act of 1933 § 30. The OCC cheered the change: Removal “is a power,”
Deputy Comptroller F. G. Awalt told Congress the following year,
that the Comptroller . . . has been asking for since 1895, but the Congress never
gave . . . us. You left us in the situation of officiating at the birth of a bank, and at its
death, but as a doctor in between with no power to make the patient take medicine. All
we could do was to suggest, and, more or less, you might say, wield the ‘big stick’. But
if they did not want to do it you could not make them do it, and the only thing you could
do was to sue them for forfeiture of charter. And if you did that it closed the bank. That
was no cure but killed the patient.
A Resolution to Investigate Practices of Stock Exchanges with Respect to the Buying and
Selling and the Borrowing and Lending of Listed Securities: Hearings on S. Res. 84 Before
the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73rd Cong. pt. 12, at 5846 (1934).
58
The Fed appeared to view the power in the way that John Somers, the Lord High
Chancellor, viewed impeachment: “The power of [i]mpeachment ought to be, like Goliath’s
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The first Fed removal occurred in January 1937. It involved the
president of a national bank in West Virginia.59 A second removal action
followed in 1938, this time against the president of a national bank in
Kentucky. In connection with these actions, the Fed explained that
Section 30 served “to stop abuses and prevent the development of
dangerous trends” and that “Congress did not contemplate that
proceedings . . . would be utilized for the correction of trivial matters.”60
According to the Fed, the removal power “should be exercised in cases
where other means of obtaining corrections of significant violations of
law or of unsound banking practices . . . have failed, or where such other
means apparently would be less appropriate or should be supplemented”
by removal.61
The Fed’s next removal action came in 1945. It involved a violation of
the law prohibiting bankers from engaging in securities dealing. The
Fed’s targets were John Agnew and F. O. Fayerweather, directors of the
Paterson National Bank in New Jersey. Agnew and Fayerweather had
refused to discontinue their work as employees of Eastman, Dillon & Co.,
a securities broker-dealer based in New York. Agnew and Fayerweather
appealed the Fed’s removal decision to federal court. The Fed argued that
removal orders were not subject to judicial review in the absence of a
charge of fraud and that in the alternative it had the authority to remove
Agnew and Fayerweather for their illegal behavior. In 1947, the Fed
prevailed on the second point—Agnew and Fayerweather lost their
appeal—but the Fed lost on the jurisdictional question: even though the
statute did not expressly authorize judicial oversight of Fed removals, a
majority of the Supreme Court concluded that Section 30 actions were
reviewable.62
sword, kept in the temple, and not used but on great occasions.” 5 The Parliamentary History
of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, at 678 (William Cobbett ed., London,
T.C. Hansard 1809).
59
Meeting Minutes, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., at 11–12 (Jan. 6, 1937).
60
Memorandum from L.P. Bethea, Assistant Sec’y, to the Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Rsrv. Sys., Proceedings Under Provisions of Section 30 of the Banking Act of 1933 (Aug. 29,
1936), in 45 Mimeograph Letters and Statements of the Board, July – December 1936, at 114,
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/archival-collection/mimeograph-letters-statements-board4957/july-december-1936-510039?start_page=113 [https://perma.cc/A5KF-EFQ2].
61
Id.
62
The Fed took the position that no review was permitted. See Brief for Petitioners, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947) (No. 66), 1946 WL 50159,
at *28–31. A majority of the Court rejected the Fed’s view, concluding that “the determination
of the extent of the authority granted the Board to issue removal orders under [section] 30 of
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The lawsuit may have had some chilling effect.63 In December 1949,
the Comptroller, Preston Delano, warned the directors of the Continental
National Bank and Trust Company in Salt Lake City to correct unsafe and
unsound lending practices in relation to the bank’s depleted capital
position.64 In May 1950, Delano informed the Fed that he was prepared
to certify a basis for removal proceedings under Section 30.65 Delano
believed that removal “offered the only practicable solution [to the capital
shortfall] and that this was much preferable to a proceeding by the FDIC
to terminate the bank’s insurance, for the latter would necessarily force
the bank to liquidate.”66
But the Comptroller picked a dangerous adversary. Although
Continental “was one of the worst, if not the worst, national bank in the
United States from the standpoint of ratio of capital to risk assets,”67
Continental was led by a powerful banker, Walter E. Cosgriff, who
controlled a group of nine banks and led the Salt Lake City Clearing
House Association.68 Cosgriff was also politically connected; he was
appointed by President Truman to the board of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation in October 1950.69
Cosgriff did not want to give up control of Continental. In letters to the
OCC, Cosgriff denied that his bank was undercapitalized and argued that
the Act is subject to judicial review.” Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Agnew, 329
U.S. 441, 444 (1947). Justices Rutledge and Frankfurter took a different position, writing that
while a removal is reviewable, “it is only for abuse of discretion” by the Board. Id. at 449
(Rutledge, J., concurring in judgment). This is so “[n]ot only because Congress has committed
the [banking] system’s operation to [the Board’s] hands, but also because the system itself is
a highly specialized and technical one, requiring expert and coordinated management in all its
phases.” Id. at 450. According to Justice Rutledge, the Board’s “judgment [on removal] should
be overturned only where there is no reasonable basis to sustain it or where [the Board]
exercise[s] it in a manner which clearly exceeds [the Board’s] statutory authority.” Id.
63
See infra note 73.
64
Letter from the Comptroller of the Currency to the Bd. of Dirs. of the Cont’l Nat’l Bank
& Tr. Co. 1 (Jan. 10, 1950). In August 1949, the bank’s ratio of capital to risk assets was one
to twelve. Letter from the Bd. of Dirs. of the Cont’l Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. to the Comptroller
of the Currency 1 (Dec. 22, 1949) [hereinafter Letter from the Bd. of Dirs.].
65
Letter from the Bd. of Dirs., supra note 64, at 1.
66
Memorandum from the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. to Mr. Millard and Mr.
Vest, Proposed Certification by Comptroller of the Currency with a View to Removal of
National Bank Directors 1 (June 1, 1950) [hereinafter Memorandum to Millard and Vest].
67
Id.
68
Cosgriff to Head Bank Group, Deseret News, Jan. 20, 1950, at 16.
69
Walter Cosgriff’s Testimony Before the Fulbright Committee, in Investigations of
Senators Joseph R. McCarthy and William Benton Pursuant to S. Res. 187 and S. Res. 304, at
46 (1953).
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“[b]anks with ‘cold storage’ policies [i.e., high capital ratios] do not serve
the public.”70 Cosgriff also escalated the conflict in the media. He argued
that the “adequacy of an existing bank’s capital is a matter for its directors
and stockholders to decide—not the bank supervisory agencies.”71 And
he called on Congress to hold hearings on the overweening powers of the
banking agencies. According to Cosgriff, the OCC “ha[d] no authority to
tell him what the bank’s capitalization or other policies shall be.”72
The Fed balked at removing Cosgriff,73 and the Comptroller never
moved forward with certification. Instead, the Fed, OCC, and FDIC
agreed to conduct a simultaneous examination and to invite Cosgriff and
the other directors to come to Washington “to work out some satisfactory
solution.”74
Despite the Cosgriff setback, the Fed did not abandon removal
authority completely. In 1952, the Fed issued notices and scheduled
hearings to remove all but one of the officers and directors of the City
National Bank of Fort Smith, Arkansas. This time the Fed achieved its
desired outcome: Fort Smith’s president stepped down and sold his stock,
and the bank’s shareholders replaced most of the directors and elected
new officers.75 In 1953, the Board also successfully threatened to remove
the president and board chairman of a state member bank, leading the
bank’s own board to act.76 And in several further cases, Fed officials in

70

Letter from the Bd. of Dirs., supra note 64, at 3.
Robert W. Bernick, Cosgriff Suggests Probe of Comptroller Office, Salt Lake Trib., Dec.
2, 1951, at 1C.
72
Nicholas P. Gregory, Authority over Banks May Be Subject to Probe, Phila. Inquirer,
Dec. 10, 1951, at 38.
73
According to the Board, “a case of this kind would be reviewable by the courts” and “the
overexpansion of loans in relation to capital is a relative matter.” In the absence of abnormal
losses that the government’s lawyers could point to before a judge, the Board feared it might
not prevail. Moreover, “even if the proceeding were successful,” the Board explained, “there
would seem to be nothing to prevent the stockholders from electing other directors to carry
out the policies desired [by Mr. Cosgriff].” Memorandum to Millard and Vest, supra note 66,
at 1.
74
Memorandum from Mr. Vest to the Files, Possible Certification by Comptroller with
Respect to Directors of National Bank (June 2, 1950).
75
Memorandum to the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. from Mr. Chase, Assistant
Solicitor, Section 30 Proceeding—City National Bank of Fort Smith, Arkansas 1 (Jan. 22,
1953).
76
See Letter from W. R. Diercks, Vice President, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., to George Sloan,
Dir., Div. of Examinations, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Apr. 1, 1953) (detailing
charges against the President and Chairman of the Board of Devon-North State Bank in
Chicago, a member of the Federal Reserve System); Letter from Nat M. Khan to Logan Ford
71
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the 1950s considered invoking Section 30, but ultimately declined to do
so.77
2. Restriction and Reform
Although the New Deal banking regime constrained bank risk taking
successfully for almost three decades, in the 1960s earnings volatility
began to grow. In 1966, in response to requests from the Johnson
Administration, Congress substantially strengthened supervision. It
passed the Financial Institution Supervisory Act (“FISA”), expanding the
remedial powers of the banking agencies.78 FISA authorized the agencies
to issue cease and desist orders, which allowed government officials to
force bankers to stop engaging in practices that they deemed unsafe or
unsound. Whereas previously the Fed’s remedy when a banker repeatedly
ignored informal supervisory directives was to remove that person, the
cease-and-desist power allowed the Fed a middle path.79
FISA also altered removal law, increasing its scope to permit
immediate but temporary removals from office (suspensions)80 and
permanent prohibitions from banking;81 dropping a requirement that the
Fed find a legal violation or unsafe or unsound practice had continued
after a warning; and adding a new removal ground, breach of fiduciary
duty. At the same time, FISA restricted removal by requiring the Fed to
find that a legal violation, unsafe practice, or breach of fiduciary duty
involved “personal dishonesty” and that it created the possibility of either
(June 29, 1953) (noting that the President “was removed for cause at a special meeting of the
Board of Directors”).
77
Sometimes this was because the relevant individual resigned. See, e.g., Letter from John
A. O’Kane, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F., to George Vest, Gen. Counsel, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Nov. 29, 1954).
78
Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1046. The
new remedial powers, added by title II of the Act to § 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(“FDIA”), were originally effective only until June 30, 1972, but were made permanent by
§ 908 of title IV of Pub. L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat. 1811 (1970).
79
Id. § 202, 80 Stat. at 1046 (amending § 8(b) of the FDIA).
80
Id. § 202, 80 Stat. at 1049 (adding § 8(e)(5) to the FDIA to allow the Fed
“suspend . . . from office . . . [an officer, director, or other person] effective upon service
of . . . notice and, unless stayed by a court . . . pending the completion of the administrative
proceedings”).
81
Id. § 202, 80 Stat. at 1048–49 (adding § 8(e)(3) and § 8(e)(5) permitting the Fed to
“prohibit . . . further participation in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of the bank”).
FISA also granted the FDIC removal authority for the first time and gave the OCC the power
to appoint national bank directors in cases where the Fed had suspended all of the bank’s
existing directors. Id. § 202, 80 Stat. at 1050 (adding § 8(g)(2) to the FDIA).
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“substantial financial loss or other damage” to the institution or “serious[]
prejudice[]” to the interest of the bank’s depositors.82
While the Fed had resisted previous efforts by members of Congress to
weaken removal authority,83 it supported FISA because it was eager to
obtain the more nimble and expansive cease-and-desist authority. The
addition of suspension and prohibition authority also closed worrisome
gaps that had permitted malfeasant bankers to inflict damage during and
after Section 30 removal proceedings.84 The Comptroller’s office
meanwhile actively supported rolling back removal power. According to
the Comptroller, removal was not particularly effective because “the
removal from office of a dominant figure does not necessarily end his
influence.”85 Besides, the Comptroller argued, there were “nonstatutory
mean[s]” to affect the removal of bank officers and directors and the
statutory process merely created delay.86 In other words, the
Comptroller’s powers of persuasion were sufficient.
Congress agreed with the Comptroller that removal (and forfeiture) had
proven inadequate—“[o]n the one hand, [these sanctions] may be too
severe for many situations . . . [o]n the other they may be so time
consuming and cumbersome that substantial injury occurs to the
institution before remedial action is effected.”87 Removal, the Senate
Banking Committee explained, could “do great harm to the individual
affected and to his institution and to the financial system as a whole.”88
82

Id. § 202, 80 Stat. at 1047–48 (adding §§ 8(e)(1)-(2)).
There had been a previous effort to clip the Fed’s wings in 1957, which Fed Chair William
McChesney Martin opposed. That change would have changed the standard of review from
“substantial evidence” to “weight of the evidence.” Financial Institutions Act of 1957:
Hearings on S. 1451 and H.R. 7026 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 85th
Cong. 23 (1957).
84
Meeting Minutes, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. 5 (Jul. 20, 1966).
85
Att’y Gen. Comm. on Admin. Proc., Administrative Procedures in Government Agencies,
S. Doc. No. 76-186, at 17 (3d Sess. 1940). “Often, the officer or director will own substantial
interests in the institution; thus removal would not end his ability to exercise his influence in
a damaging manner.” Joseph M. Korff, Current Legislation, Banking: The Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, 8 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 599, 611 (1967).
86
Meeting Minutes, supra note 84, at 5.
87
S. Rep. No. 89-1482, at 3536–38 (1966) (quoting a letter from the Secretary of the
Treasury, Chairman of the Fed, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and
Chairman of the FDIC).
88
Id. at 3539. Concern that removal, like its earlier cousin charter forfeiture, would prove
too severe and that something like a cease-and-desist power was needed dates back to the
Depression. See, e.g., Hearings on S. Res. 84 Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency,
73d Cong. 5787 (1935) (statement of Sen. Couzens) (“I do not think the removal of the officers
of a bank will always rehabilitate the bank . . . I am of [the] opinion there should be some
83
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Congress was also concerned that “unsafe” and “unsound” have no
“definite or fixed meaning” and that, therefore, “a broad construction of
these terms might result in the issuance of suspension or removal orders
on the basis of nothing more than a difference of opinion about the most
debatable of management problems.”89 According to the Senate Banking
Committee, it was not “desirable to leave any opening for such a result,”
and therefore, removal power “must be strictly limited and carefully
guarded.”90 Hence “the further requirement that the violation or practice
must be ‘one involving personal dishonesty on the part of such director or
officer.’”91
FISA’s changes meant the Fed could no longer remove recklessly riskseeking bankers of the sort Comptroller Delano had criticized at
Continental.92 However, legislators appeared to read “personal
dishonesty” broadly enough to encompass self-dealing and other
noncriminal conduct. For example, one senator said that the revised
removal authority was designed to stop “the flow of losses through the
hands of self-seeking or criminal elements” and that a banker could be
removed for failing to exhibit “the integrity demanded by a position of
public trust.”93 In other words, the function of removal remained
unchanged: removal ensured that those who “handl[e] other people’s
money under special licenses granted by the Government in the public
interest” act to advance “the interests of depositors, borrowers, and the
public.”94
C. 1978: Removing the Honest Banker
Soon after FISA became law, concerns arose that Congress had
“deprived the [banking] agencies of any efficient remedy to meet [the]
serious problem [of] grossly incompetent management.”95 Bank closures
additional statutory provision that the Comptroller of the Currency may either close the bank
or have something else done [besides removal] that would not create such a condition [i.e., an
undercapitalized bank] as I have just described.”).
89
S. Rep. No. 89-1482, at 3539 (1966).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
112 Cong. Rec. 19,223 (Aug. 19, 1966) (“[L]ike all human institutions, our banks and
savings and loan associations . . . from time to time [have] been the victims of careless or
irresponsible individuals or, on extremely rare occasions, outright criminals.”).
93
112 Cong. Rec. 20,232–33 (Aug. 22, 1966).
94
S. Rep. No. 89-1482, at 3540 (1966).
95
Korff, supra note 85, at 614–15.
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continued, reprising their 1965 peak of nine in 1969, and then spiking to
thirteen and sixteen in 1975 and 1976, respectively.96 The 1974 failure of
Franklin National Bank was especially salient: its collapse was the largest
in nominal terms in U.S history,97 reverberated internationally,98 and led
the Fed and nine other central banks to announce they would do whatever
“necessary” to stabilize the system.99
In 1976, Congress ordered the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) to review bank oversight and propose new legislation. The
GAO’s report, released in January 1977, did not identify any instances in
which the banking agencies used either removal or cease-and-desist
powers between 1966 and 1971.100 And although the agencies had
initiated 108 actions and forty-nine removals over the subsequent six
years,101 the GAO concluded that more actions had been merited.102
The GAO also argued that FISA had excessively constrained the Fed’s
removal powers. “[M]ost bank failures in the last 5 years,” it explained,
“were caused by individual bank managers who followed self-serving
loan practices or were incompetent as stated in examination reports and
correspondence.” Further, “57 percent [of the banks on the government’s
problem list] were cited by examiners for ineffective management.”103

96

Elmer B. Staats, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States:
Highlights of a Study of Federal Supervision of State and National Banks 7 (1977) [hereinafter
GAO Report].
97
John H. Allan, Franklin Found Insolvent by U.S. and Taken Over, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9,
1974, at 1; see also Andrew F. Brimmer, The Federal Reserve and the Failure of Franklin
National Bank: A Case Study of Regulation, in Business and the American Economy, 1776–
2001, at 108 (Jules Backman ed., 1976).
98
See Brimmer, supra note 97, at 110, 118; Benjamin Braun, Arie Krampf & Steffen Murau,
Financial Globalization as Positive Integration: Monetary Technocrats and the Eurodollar
Market in the 1970s, 28 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 794, 810–11 (2021) (describing the impact of
the collapse of Franklin National Bank throughout Europe).
99
Clyde H. Farnsworth, 10 Nations Plan Bank Aid to Shore Up Confidence, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 11, 1974, at 93; Statement of Central Bankers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1974, at 64.
100
The report explicitly noted that the FDIC had failed to use its cease-and-desist authority
prior to 1971. See GAO Report, supra note 96, at app. III, at III-48. It did not discuss explicitly
the activity of the other agencies but did document their cease-and-desist and removal actions
from 1971 to 1976. See id. at 25–27. See also John C. Deal, Bank Regulatory Enforcement—
Some New Dimensions, 40 Bus. Law. 1319, 1320 (1985).
101
Comm. on Gov’t Operations, Federal Response to Criminal Misconduct and Insider
Abuse in the Nation’s Financial Institutions, H.R. Rep. No. 98-1137, at 143 (1984). Four of
these were Fed removals; the rest were split between the FDIC and OCC. Id.
102
GAO Report, supra note 96, at 48.
103
Id.
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Removal could not reach these “incompetent” managers. Moreover, even
when a banker is dishonest, it “is sometimes difficult to [prove].”104
Accordingly, the GAO recommended Congress empower the agencies
to remove bank officers for gross negligence and to levy fines against
bank officers for legal violations,105 and the agencies agreed.106 The
resulting legislation, the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest
Rate Control Act (“FIRIRCA”), loosened the 1966 restrictions on
removal by allowing the Fed to remove any individual who “demonstrates
a willful or continuing disregard for . . . [the] safety and soundness” of a
bank.107 FIRIRCA also loosened the requirement that agencies show
either an institution was likely to suffer substantial financial loss or other
damage or that the depositors were likely to be seriously prejudiced by
adding “receipt of financial gain by the individual.”108
According to the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban
Affairs, the new provisions “g[a]ve the regulatory agencies a less
burdensome test under which they may institute removal proceedings.”109
Importantly, the agencies could now “move against individuals who may
not be acting in a fraudulent manner but who are nonetheless acting in a
manner which threatens the soundness of their institution.”110 The Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs saw things similarly:
the Committee supported the amendment because “[t]he requirement that
fraudulent behavior be shown as a precondition for removal has hampered
the regulators from taking timely action against individuals where actions
have had adverse effects on financial institutions.”111

104

Id.
Id. at 49.
106
Id. at 48; Statement by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on the
GAO Report (Jan. 16, 1977), in Federal Supervision of State and National Banks: A Study by
the Comptroller General of the United States app. II-1, at II-24 (1977); see also Financial
Institutions Regulatory Act of 1978, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, at 18 (1978).
107
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95630 § 107(d)(1), 92 Stat. 3641, 3656–57 (amending § 8(e) of the FDIA).
108
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs., Financial Institutions Supervisory Act
Amendments of 1977, S. Rep. No. 95-323, at 7 (1977). FIRIRCA also responded to Feinberg
v. FDIC, 420 F. Supp. 109 (D.D.C. 1976), by providing an opportunity for agency hearing
prior to suspensions. Financial Institutions Regulatory Act of 1978, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383,
at 18–19 (1978).
109
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, at 18.
110
Id.
111
S. Rep. No. 95-323, at 7.
105
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D. 1989: Further Expansion
The banking agencies did not initially embrace the expanded authority
Congress granted them in FIRIRCA. The Fed removed no one in 1980112
and just one executive in 1981.113 When Penn Square Bank failed in 1982,
Congress held two full days of hearings, calling the Comptroller and the
FDIC Chair to testify.114 Although the Comptroller, Penn Square, and its
directors “enter[ed] into a formal written agreement to cease and desist
from unsound and illegal practices” in September of 1980, the agreement,
according to Ferdinand St. Germain, the Chair of the House Banking
Committee, “had all the sting of a flogging with a wet noodle.”115 Instead,
the serious weaknesses at the bank were covered up and hidden from the
public and the bank’s counterparties, and Congress feared it would find
that “once again nothing effective was done to curb [mismanagement]
practices.”116 These fears were realized as the hearings soon revealed that
bank executives had engaged in “substantial insider transactions.”117
When the question turned to removal, the OCC took the mystifying
position that the personal dishonesty requirement still pertained.118
Following the hearing the OCC conceded that it had the authority to
proceed in cases not involving dishonesty, provided the relevant
individuals continually disregard the safety and soundness of the bank.
Yet, according to the Comptroller, the management of Penn Square had

112
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Annual Report on Formal Enforcement Actions
(1980) (on file with authors). The OCC issued a notice of charges to remove the president of
a small bank with assets of between $25 and $50 million. Comptroller of the Currency, 1980
Annual Report 108.
113
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Annual Report on Formal Enforcement Actions
81-25 (1981) (on file with authors) (suspending bank chairman and president following
indictment for personal and corporate federal income tax violations and violations of the U.S.
currency reporting laws).
114
Penn Square Bank Failure: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urb. Affs.,
97th Cong., at iii (1982).
115
Id. at 2.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 100.
118
“Our intent” in 1978, the Chair explained, “was to give you the power that you needed
without a finding of fraud or illegality.” To this, the Senior Deputy Comptroller for
Supervision replied, “there must be a personal act of dishonesty present before we start a
removal.” “In other words,” the Chair replied, “you ignore the statute.” “No,” the Deputy
insisted, “that is the advice that our general counsel gives us, that we must have that factor
present before we are able to go forward. That may be a fallacious interpretation, but it is the
agency’s legal opinion.” Id. at 99.
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merely needed strengthening, and “removal . . . [was] neither appropriate
under the statute nor necessary to effect management changes.”119
The Fed’s record in the 1980s was better. Although it issued no
removal orders in 1982 or 1983, it averaged eleven suspensions,
removals, or prohibitions each year between 1984 and 1988. All but two
of these fifty-four orders targeted bank officers or directors, and the
exceptions involved a scheme that also led to the removal of the bank’s
president.120 Moreover, many involved situations where personal
dishonesty was not involved or likely would have been challenging to
prove in court.
But underlying structural problems and limits on the Fed’s jurisdiction
meant its efforts were inadequate to check wholesale weakening across
the financial system. By the second half of the 1980s, a race to the bottom
between state and federal regulators (and between banks and thrifts)
culminated in a massive wave of bank failures known as the Savings and
Loan Crisis. In 1987, 262 FDIC-insured banks failed. That September,
the stock market fell 23% in one day. In 1988, another 470 insured
depository institutions failed, followed by 534 in 1989.121
In response to this unraveling, Congress enacted the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(“FIRREA”). FIRREA expanded the Fed’s removal power in several
ways. First, it changed the law to permit removals of any institutionrelated party, not just officers and directors.122 Second, it specified that
119

Letter from Paul M. Homan, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision, to
Honorable Fernand J. St. Germain, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urb. Affs. (Jul. 29,
1982) (on file with authors).
120
Data on 1984–1988 removal actions were hand collected from the corresponding Federal
Reserve System Annual Reports. For details about the two exceptions who were former
employees of a bank in the bank municipal securities department, see Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 1984 Annual Report 23.
121
See Menand, supra note 16, at 1556.
122
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 10173, § 903, 103 Stat. 183, 453 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818) (amending § 8(e)(1) of the
FDIA). Around this time, pursuant to the 1990 Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act, Congress empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
to obtain federal court orders barring individuals who violate the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws from future service as officers or directors of public companies. See
Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 Bus.
Law. 391, 395 (2004). In 2002, in Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress empowered the SEC to impose
bars in administrative cease-and-desist proceedings as well. Id. at 407. But unlike the Fed’s
removal power, which originates from agency cost concerns about senior bank executives, the
SEC’s authority has injunctive roots. See id. at 393–94. This translates to a crucial difference:

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

28

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1

“indirect[]” violations of law, unsafe or unsound practices, and breaches
of fiduciary duties could give rise to a removal order, as could violations
of final cease-and-desist orders, conditions imposed in writing in
connection with a bank’s applications or requests, and any written
agreements entered into between banks and the agencies.123 Third,
FIRREA deleted the adjectives “seriously” and “substantial,” which had
modified the 1966 requirement that regulators find either the likelihood
of financial loss or other harm and prejudice to depositors before
removing an individual. Fourth, it reversed a D.C. Circuit case, decided
earlier that year, which had concluded that the Fed lacked the authority to
invoke Section 1818(e) after a banker had already left office (either by
resigning or because they were terminated).124 FIRREA expressly
authorized the Fed to pursue prohibition up to six years later.
The result is a statutory scheme that gives the Fed wide-ranging
discretion to pursue suspensions, removals, and prohibitions against
executives, investors, employees, and third parties in a variety of
circumstances in order to check excessive risk taking and prevent bank
failures. While it continues to outsource to private shareholders the power
to appoint bank executives, it tempers this delegation with for-cause
removal authority, which it grants to public officials as a way of checking
abuses.
II. BANKER REMOVAL IN PRACTICE
As explained above, FIRREA required the Fed to make its enforcement
activity public. This Part takes advantage of that change in the law to
analyze a unique dataset of all removal orders (including suspensions and
prohibitions) issued by the Fed since 1989.
The data reveal a disconnect between the conception of the banker
removal power that Congress has long embraced—as a tool to align senior
bankers with the public interest—and how the Fed has used the power in
practice. This Part documents this gap by detailing whom the Fed has
removed, how often removal occurs, and for what reasons. Our analysis
regardless of whether the SEC seeks a bar through judicial decree or administrative
proceedings, the SEC must prove a concrete violation of securities laws and at least some risk
of re-offense. See 5 Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 16:9,
at 778 (7th ed. 2016); SEC v. E-Smart Techs., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 3d 170, 181 (D.D.C. 2015).
123
§ 903, 103 Stat. at 453.
124
Stoddard v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 868 F.2d 1308, 1310 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
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raises normative questions about whether the removal authority must be
modernized to reflect the institutional decentralization and many layers
separating bank officers from business execution that characterize the
modern banking environment.
A. The Data
The Fed disclosed almost no information about its enforcement activity
prior to 1989. In 1989, the House of Representatives criticized this
secrecy as “do[ing] little to deter misconduct, but [serving] to ultimately
worsen the problems of financial institutions.”125 Congress responded by
requiring federal banking agencies to publish “any final order” issued in
connection with a civil enforcement action, barring exceptional
circumstances.126
Today, the Fed maintains a database of formal enforcement actions on
its public website.127 For the years after 1996, this database includes the
name of each sanctioned individual, the name of the affiliated bank, the
date, and links to corresponding press releases and final orders. The
documents in turn provide a range of information, including position,
employment status, and findings of fact. But for entries between 1989 and
1996 many of these data are missing because links to the corresponding
final orders are unavailable. We were able to obtain all but two of these
orders through a FOIA request.128
We also requested every formal Section 1818(e) order issued between
1933 and 1989. The Board responded with annual summaries of removal

125
Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urb. Affs., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989, H.R. Rep. No. 101-54, at 470 (1989).
126
§ 913, 103 Stat. at 483–84.
127
Enforcement Actions, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/enforcementactions.htm
[https://perma.cc/29NG-GVH4] (last visited June 15, 2020). Within this database, we limited
our search to enforcement actions in the “prohibition from banking” category of the “type of
action” field. Prior to October 13, 2006, removal proceedings that were initiated by the OCC
involving affiliates of a national banking association or a District depository institution were
certified to the Fed for final decision. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(4) (2000); Financial Services
Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 303, 120 Stat. 1966, 1970 (2006)
(repealing this provision). Because the Fed ultimately determined whether a removal order
would be issued in these cases, they are included in our dataset.
128
See Letter from Michele Taylor Fennell, Assistant Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Rsrv. Sys., to Da Lin, Assistant Professor of L., Univ. of Rich. Sch. of L. (Feb. 26, 2020) (on
file with authors).
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actions from 1980 to 1988,129 but redacted the names of individuals and
institutions.130 We further located three boxes at the National Archives
and Records Administration that contain correspondence relating to
removal actions pursued by the Fed between 1933 and 1954.131 Because
the pre-1989 records contain less detail than the post-1989 ones, the
analysis below is limited to the more recent orders, supplemented by
information from pre-1989 cases as appropriate.
The dataset captures removal actions against affiliates of both domestic
institutions and foreign banks with U.S. operations. The bulk of analysis,
however, excludes actions associated with (1) foreign bank branches,
agencies, representative offices, and non-bank subsidiaries; and (2)
individuals who live and work abroad for two reasons—one pragmatic
and one conceptual. The pragmatic reason is that foreign bank branches
and agencies report assets and other financial data at a local level instead
of at a consolidated level like domestic institutions, so their inclusion
would muddle the probative value of the data.132 The conceptual reason
is that supervision and enforcement against foreign banks (and their
employees) present unique obstacles that are not present in domestic bank
cases. Regulation of foreign banks’ U.S. operations has traditionally been
designed to accommodate some degree of “consolidated supervision” by
the banks’ home-country regulators,133 and resolution of problems at
foreign branches depends on “[c]ooperation and frank and timely

129
See Letter from Margaret McCloskey Shanks, Deputy Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Rsrv. Sys., to Da Lin, Assistant Professor of L., Univ. of Rich. Sch. of L. (July 17, 2019)
(on file with authors).
130
See id.
131
The Archives records are located in Boxes 195–97, “Central Subject Files, 1913-1954,”
Record Group 82, “Records of the Federal Reserve System, 1913-2003,” National Archives
and Records Administration.
132
Each branch or agency of a given foreign bank files its own separate financial disclosures
with the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (“FFIEC”). See Fed. Fin. Insts.
Examination Council, Instructions for the Preparation of Report of Assets and Liabilities of
U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks, at GEN-2 (2020). By contrast, U.S. depository
institutions report their finances at the consolidated bank or bank holding company level. See
Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Instructions for Preparation of Consolidated Reports of
Condition and Income 10a–11 (2020). Finally, representative offices and non-bank
subsidiaries of foreign banks do not file financial disclosures with the FFIEC because they
may not take deposits or make loans.
133
Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Regulation of
Foreign Banking Organizations, Remarks at the Yale School of Management Leaders Forum
(Nov. 28, 2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20121128a.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q9JM-Q6PZ].
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communication” between U.S. and foreign bank supervisors.134 Dropping
these fifty observations removes approximately 21% of the data.
Most of the remaining orders are easy to categorize; they have a clear
issuance date and contain relatively detailed descriptions of the
individual’s conduct and relationship to the bank. But there are some edge
cases. First, in a large minority of cases, enforcement orders only vaguely
describe the underlying conduct and the individual’s relationship to the
organization. For example, an order against Charles Rowland merely
describes him as “a former institution-affiliated party” and does not
mention why he was sanctioned.135 Whenever possible, we filled these
gaps with hand-collected information from contemporaneous news
accounts and related lawsuits.
Second, although we assigned each order to a single primary
misconduct category, perhaps inevitably, the categories sometimes
overlap in ways that introduce a degree of subjectivity. For example,
employees who embezzled or engaged in other forms of self-dealing often
attempted to cover up their activities by falsifying records or lying to
regulators.136 We coded the orders based on our assessment of the
dominant reason that led to removal.
134

Press Release, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig
Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, on the Supervision of Foreign Banks in the
U.S. (Dec. 5, 1995), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/1995/nr-occ1995-133.html [https://perma.cc/C2U7-JNWG]. For an example of socio-political influences
on enforcement decisions against foreign banks, see, e.g., Ben McLannahan, Osborne
Intervened in US HSBC Money-Laundering Probe, Report Says, Fin. Times (July 12, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/2be49f84-47c9-11e6-b387-64ab0a67014c
[https://perma.cc/GH2A-Y536] (reporting that Britain’s former Chancellor of the Exchequer
and the U.K. Financial Services Authority intervened to persuade the U.S. government not to
pursue criminal charges against HSBC for money laundering). For an insightful account of
how foreign banks present unique supervisory challenges to U.S. regulators, see generally
Jeremy C. Kress, Domesticating Foreign Finance, 73 Fla. L. Rev. 951 (2021). But cf. David
Zaring, Enforcement Against the Biggest Banks (2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3678439
[https://perma.cc/45NY4WVJ] (finding that, between 2010 and 2016, U.S. banking regulators pursued the same
number of enforcement actions against large domestic and foreign banks).
135
Consent Ord., Charles N. Rowland, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 93-035E-I1 (Dec. 6, 1994) (on file with author).
136
For instance, the § 1818(e) actions against Thomas and Mark Huston alleged that they
“authorized a series of loans to one another which cumulatively exceeded federal and state
lending limits to bank officers, and then concealed or attempted to conceal some of those
violations from state and federal banking examiners.” Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Permanently Bars Thomas H. Huston and T. Mark
Huston from Participating in the Banking Industry (July 28, 2016).
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Third, sometimes the Fed issued multiple orders against the same
individual for the same conduct at the same bank. Generally, these
duplicate entries arise either because the Fed suspended the individual
from office (first entry)137 and then subsequently prohibited the individual
from further participation in the banking industry (second entry), or
because the Fed publicly issued a notice of intent to pursue a
Section 1818(e) action (first entry) and then later issued a formal removal
order (second entry). Relatedly, for a few orders, the order itself or a
contemporaneous lawsuit references an earlier, related Section 1818(e)
action that does not appear on the Fed’s website or in the FOIA records
that we received. For example, the 1995 order against Ernest Vickers, III,
refers to the Fed’s “issuance, on September 28, 1990, of a Notice of
Intention to Remove from Office and of Prohibition and Order of
Suspension against Vickers.”138 In all of these cases, we used the earliest
formal action and dropped notices as well as subsequent entries.139
We matched the removal actions to financial data from the Reports of
Condition and Reports of Income banks and bank holding companies
(“BHCs”) file quarterly.140 Our dataset offers a reasonably comprehensive
137
Both 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(3) and § 1818(g)(1) allow federal banking regulators to
suspend a bank affiliate from office or temporarily prohibit her from further participation in
the banking industry. Section 1818(e)(3) allows for a suspension order if the supervisory
agency “determines that such action is necessary for the protection of the depository institution
or the interests of the depository institution’s depositors.” 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(3). Section
1818(g)(1) is narrower and allows for the suspension of a bank affiliate who has been charged
with either a felony involving dishonesty or certain other criminal violations. See id.
§ 1818(g)(1)(A). If the individual is convicted and the conviction is no longer subject to
judicial review, the supervisory agency may make the order permanent. See id.
§ 1818(g)(1)(C)(i). In practice, the Fed has also invoked § 1818(e) when issuing a permanent
removal order after a § 1818(g) suspension. See, e.g., Consent Ord., The NorCrown Tr., Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 05-010-B-HC (Feb. 10, 2005),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2005/20050210/attachment.pd
f [https://perma.cc/VNB7-EJJT].
138
Consent Ord., Vickers, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 90-047-E-I (July 14,
1995) (on file with author).
139
In 2017, the Fed issued a notice of intent to pursue a § 1818(e) prohibition against Fang
Fang, a former employee of J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited, but it has not taken
any other action against Fang since then. See Consent Ord., Fang, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 17-006-E-I (March 9, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20170310a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C268-3F67]. Because
the Fed has not taken any actual enforcement action against Fang to date, he was excluded
from our dataset.
140
We matched removal actions to Call Reports using each bank and bank holding
company’s unique identifier, known as its RSSD ID. See Definitions of Banking Terms, Nat’l
Info.
Ctr.
(last
visited
June
16,
2020),
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picture of the Fed’s removal activity between 1989 and 2019. The data
does not, however, capture the full range of federal removal actions,
which would require the inclusion of orders issued by the OCC, the FDIC,
and the now-defunct Office of Thrift Supervision.141 Each banking
agency occasionally publishes counts of completed civil enforcement
actions, and these statistics reveal the pace of enforcement does vary from
agency to agency, with the Fed’s enforcement numbers at the lower end
of the spectrum.142 With that said, among the federal bank supervisors,
https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/Content/HELP/DefinitionsOfBankingTerms.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q8QU-G7AL]. If the institution named in the removal order matched with
more than one RSSD ID, we confirmed the institution’s identity using its location and
institution type. Once again, some coding complexities deserve mention. First, a large number
of orders list both a bank holding company and its subsidiary bank (or banks) in the caption.
In constructing financial variables, we matched the enforcement orders to the data reported by
the largest U.S. institution named in the caption—typically, the bank holding company. If the
largest U.S. institution did not report call data, we used the largest call data reporter. Second,
we generally matched orders to financial data using the issuance date, but some banks had
closed or were acquired by the time enforcement occurred. In these cases, we took the
maximum value from the last four quarterly reports prior to the quarter the bank ceased
operations. We used this methodology even if the institution continued filing financial
disclosures under its own RSSD ID after the acquisition or closing date because the reported
figures may be tainted by the merger or bank resolution process. Third, two actions in the
dataset involved individuals who committed fraud or embezzlement at one bank but were
working at a different bank at the time they were removed. Because the orders removed these
employees from their more recent jobs, they were coded as being associated with those
employers. Two other actions involved employees who committed fraud or embezzlement at
two unrelated banks and were no longer working at either bank at the time of the Fed’s
enforcement order. We matched these actions with data from the first institution listed on the
order caption.
141
See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (defining “appropriate Federal banking agency” as referring to
either the OCC, FDIC, or the Fed, depending on the type of banking institution). The Office
of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) was eliminated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 313, 124 Stat. 1376, 1523 (2010). For
a broad survey of federal financial regulatory bodies, see generally Cong. Rsch. Serv.,
R44918, Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Framework
(2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44918.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D3C-D38J].
142
A recent study by the Offices of Inspector General for several federal banking regulators,
for example, found that, between Jan. 1, 2008 and September 30, 2013, the FDIC issued
removal orders against eighty-six individuals who were associated with failed banks; the OCC
and OTS each issued nineteen such removal orders; and the Fed issued four. Offs. of Inspector
Gen., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. & Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, Dep’t of the Treasury, Enforcement Actions and Professional Liability Claims
Against Institution-Affiliated Parties and Individuals Associated with Failed Institutions 15
(2014),
https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/board-actions-claims-failed-institutionsjul2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HX8-P7S8] [hereinafter OIG Report]. A 1977 Comptroller
General report similarly found significant variance. See Report to the Congress by the
Comptroller General of the United States: Highlights of a Study of Federal Supervision of
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the Fed has the broadest purview and the “broadest sight lines across the
economy,” so a deep understanding of its enforcement activity alone can
yield valuable insights.143 Unfortunately, a fully comprehensive study is
not practicable at this time because some bank supervisors limit access to
past Section 1818(e) orders and have not produced them in response to
our FOIA requests.144
B. Thirty Years of Removals: A Brief Overview
When compared to the total number of employees working in
commercial banks, the number of removals pursued by the Fed is tiny.
Between 1980 and 2019, the Fed completed an average of 7.2 actions each
year for a total of 289 orders. By contrast, the number of employees
working in BHCs and banks supervised by the Fed averaged
approximately 2.77 million during the past five years.145 The Fed’s
removal activity appears low even when compared with the overall rate
of federal criminal convictions for bank fraud, which ranged from 421 to
599 each year between 2015 and 2019.146
It is possible that the Fed is ceding some of its removal jurisdiction to
other bank regulators.147 For example, our data show that the Fed pursues
significantly fewer removals against affiliates of BHCs (which also have
a different bank-level supervisor such as the OCC) than against affiliates
of state-member banks (for which the Fed is the sole supervisor),
particularly in recent years. But if this is so, it remains unclear why the
Fed defers. Oversight at the bank level presents a risk of
underenforcement because banks can shop their charter based on “laxity

State and National Banks 26–27 (1977) (finding that, between 1971 and 1976, the OCC took
twenty-six removal actions, the FDIC took nineteen actions, and the Fed took four actions).
143
Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., The Federal Reserve’s
Financial Stability Agenda (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/brainard20141203a.htm [https://perma.cc/42TU-T75C].
144
We submitted a similar FOIA request to the OCC in May of 2019 and are in the process
of appealing their response.
145
This figure is calculated from Call Reports data, which are described in Section II.A.
146
Federal Criminal Enforcement, TRACFed (last visited May. 25, 2020),
https://tracfed.syr.edu/index/index.php?layer=cri [https://perma.cc/C5BZ-5PBS] (tallying “#
convicted” for 18 U.S.C. § 1344).
147
While the Fed cannot pursue § 1818(e) actions against individuals who are solely
affiliates of a BHC’s depository institution subsidiaries, its jurisdiction covers employees,
officers, directors, and other affiliates of the BHCs themselves as well as their non-bank
subsidiaries. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (defining “appropriate Federal banking agency”).
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in regulation.”148 Oversight at the holding company-level avoids this
problem. The Fed has also actively issued institution-level enforcement
actions against BHCs based on misconduct that occurred at the bank level.
It is puzzling why enforcements against individuals would be treated
differently.
As Figure 1 illustrates, removals against affiliates of domestic banks
and BHCs roughly track general U.S. banking conditions. The number of
completed actions peaked in 1988, around the height of the Savings and
Loan Crisis, then steadily declined during the 1990s. It rose again in the
leadup to the 2008 financial crisis but dropped off sharply after 2009. In
the last few years, we have seen yet another resurgence, though this recent
increase curiously coincides with a period of growth and stability in the
banking system.
Figure 1

148
See Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial
Politics: A Review Essay, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1991, 2043 (2014) (observing that “[a]ttracting
charters was critical for OCC and OTS because their budgets came primarily from the
assessments levied against the banks . . . [rather than] congressional appropriations”). The
Fed, by contrast, is not funded by industry assessments. Federal Reserve System, The Fed
Explained: What the Central Bank Does 4 (2021).
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Figure 2: Number of Removal Actions Against Affiliates of
Domestic and Foreign1 Institutions, 1980–2019

1
“Foreign” institutions include foreign banks and holding companies, as well as their U.S.
branches, agencies, subsidiary banks, and Edge Act corporations.

Figure 2 compares the Fed’s removal activity against affiliates of
domestic and foreign institutions. While the number of removal actions
against foreign affiliates for most years is much lower than the number
against domestic affiliates, there have been two distinct periods during
which foreign bank actions spiked. The first period, beginning in 1991
and peaking in 1997, followed a series of scandals involving foreign
banks in the late 1980s and early 1990s.149 Eleven of the thirty removal
orders relate to the most well-known of these frauds: the multi-billiondollar collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(“BCCI”).150 The scandals also led to a significant expansion of the Fed’s

149

See Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & Anita Ramasastry, The Importance of Being Honest—
Lessons from an Era of Large-Scale Financial Fraud, 41 St. Louis U. L.J. 93, 95–98 (1996)
(describing the fraud and losses that occurred at Daiwa Bank, Barings Bank, and the Bank of
Credit and Commerce International).
150
See id. at 95–96; The BCCI Affair: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism,
Narcotics, and Int’l Operations of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Part 5, 102d Cong. 144
(1992) [hereinafter The BCCI Affair] (statement of James Virgil Mattingly, Jr., Gen. Couns.,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.) (describing the Fed’s enforcement actions stemming
from the BCCI fraud); cf. Tarullo, supra note 133 (explaining that the BCCI scandal
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supervisory capabilities and duties with respect to the U.S. operations of
foreign banks. In 1991, Congress passed the Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act, which, among other things, required the Fed to conduct
annual examinations of foreign branches and agencies.151
The second wave of enforcement began between 2015 and 2017, in the
wake of the Justice Department’s investigations into several foreign
banks for their roles in facilitating tax evasion and manipulating the
foreign currency market. In 2015, the Fed issued temporary suspension
orders against five former Credit Suisse employees who had been
indicted—in 2011, four years earlier—for allegedly helping wealthy
Americans evade taxes by hiding money in undeclared Swiss bank
accounts.152 Then in 2016 and 2017, the Fed barred from banking six
traders who allegedly coordinated transactions to rig foreign exchange
rates while employed at Barclays and HSBC.153
Imposition of these sanctions can be highly uneven, as the prohibitions
relating to foreign currency manipulation reveal. In one of those cases,
Barclays’s Christopher Ashton allegedly colluded with Citigroup trader
Rohan Ramchandani, JPMorgan Chase trader Richard Usher, and UBS
trader Matt Gardiner using private chatrooms to discuss their trading
strategies.154 Ashton, Ramchandani, and Usher were tried (and acquitted)
together; Gardiner chose to cooperate with prosecutors in exchange for a
non-prosecution agreement.155 But only Ashton and Gardiner, who
worked for foreign banks, have been prohibited from the industry to date.
Although the OCC—which shares jurisdiction over the relevant
institutions—has fined and issued notices of charges against

“highlighted the need for more effective supervision of banks operating in multiple
countries”).
151
Pub. L. No. 102-242, §§ 201–15, 105 Stat. 2236, 2286–305 (1991); see also The BCCI
Affair, supra note 150, at 149 (describing the FBSEA and changes the Fed made in response
to strengthen its supervisory capacity).
152
See Notice, Walder, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (May 4, 2015) (No. 15-012G-I),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20150511a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JBS8-VE3U].
153
See Enforcement Actions, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/enforcementactions.htm
[https://perma.cc/UJ4V-CUR8] [hereinafter Enforcement Actions] (search “Prohibition from
Banking” actions in 2016 and 2017).
154
See Katie Martin & Caroline Binham, Cleared British Traders Put US Justice on Trial,
Fin. Times (Nov. 25, 2018).
155
See id.
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Ramchandani and Usher,156 no further action has been taken against them
to date.
C. Rank-and-File, Already-Terminated Employees
Prohibition orders against former employees or bank affiliates are by
far the most common type of enforcement action in our dataset: 92.5% of
the orders (173 of 187) temporarily or permanently prohibited people who
were no longer working in banking from re-joining a bank in the future.157
Section 1818(e) actions were rarely directed against sitting employees or
current bank affiliates. Only seven of the 187 orders (3.7%) in our dataset
permanently removed—and simultaneously prohibited from banking—an
individual who was still involved with a bank at the time of the
enforcement order. The most recent of these removals was issued in 2001.
In seven other cases, the Fed suspended a sitting employee from office or
a shareholder from exercising control. Six of these seven suspensions took
156

Press Release, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Issues Notice of Charges
to Prohibit and Assess $5 Million Penalty Against Two Foreign Exchange Traders (Jan. 11,
2017),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2017/nr-occ-2017-6.html
[https://perma.cc/2RSU-RNVS]. Foreign regulators have in fact complained that their U.S.
counterparts disproportionately sanction foreign banks. See, e.g., David Zaring, How the Fed
Is Flexing Its Muscles as a Banking Regulator, N.Y. Times (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/business/dealbook/fed-banking-regulator.html
[https://perma.cc/ZCE7-VE4W].
157
In one instance, the Fed ordered the dismissal of the Chairman and CEO of a bank using
its authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1831o. See Prompt Corrective Action Directive, Orion Bank,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Nov. 9, 2009) (No. 09-185-PCA-SM),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20091113a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88UT-YQRT] (directing Orion Bank to “dismiss Jerry Williams [], its
current chief executive officer, president, and chairman of its board of directors, from office
and as a member of the board of directors”). Section 1831o empowers the Fed to order prompt
corrective actions; in the case of banks that meet the definition of “significantly
undercapitalized,” the Fed can make changes to management, including “[d]ismissing
directors or senior executive officers.” 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2)(F)(ii) (2018). Following the
prompt corrective action directive, the Fed issued a § 1818(e) order that barred the individual
from future participation in banking. See Consent Ord., Williams, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 12-035-E-I (June 12, 2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20120613a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5XY-HPJQ]. Because
the individual was no longer working at the bank at the time of the § 1818(e) action, we coded
him as a former employee. If this case was instead coded as a removal of a current employee
based on the § 1831o order, the total number of actions against current employees or affiliates
would increase slightly from 7.5% to 8%. We also examined all 58 prompt corrective action
directives issued by the Fed since 1999, the first year for which the directives are publicly
accessible, and did not find any other instance in which the Fed ordered the departure of an
employee or affiliate.
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place before 2006, and a majority were initiated following a criminal
indictment.158
There are several possible reasons why the Fed almost never removes
or suspends bank employees from office. First, allegations of misconduct
must be investigated and substantiated before an enforcement action can
be initiated, and such investigations take time.159 This delay is
compounded by the fact that supervisors typically pursue fixes and
enforcement options at the institution-level first.160 Accordingly, banks
may proactively sever their affiliation upon learning that an individual is
under investigation. As a former Fed governor explains, “the actual or
planned initiation of removal and suspension proceedings usually results
in resignations of the individuals cited, thereby obviating the need to
complete the removal action.”161

158

See Removal Orders, supra note 11.
See OIG Report, supra note 142, at 12–13 (describing the process by which federal bank
supervisors investigate and pursue enforcement actions against individuals); Korff, supra note
85, at 604 (describing the removal power as “unwieldy” because “[l]engthy hearings were
required before removal . . . orders could be issued”).
160
See Niel Willardson & Jackie Brunmeier, Supervisory Enforcement Actions Since
FIRREA and FDICIA, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Minneapolis (Sept. 1, 2006),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2006/supervisory-enforcement-actions-since-firreaand-fdicia [https://perma.cc/49W2-4P54] (explaining that “[s]upervisors often focus first on
stemming losses and curtailing dangerous practices and only later on determining which
individuals were sufficiently culpable to warrant individual enforcement actions, a process
that is often time consuming”).
161
Statement by J. Charles Partee, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Before
the Com., Consumer & Monetary Affs. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations,
May 3, 1984, in Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Bulletin 423, 425
(May 1984).
159

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

40

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1

Table 1: Removal Actions by Type and Affiliation, 1989–20191
Former employees or affiliates

173 (92.5%)

Permanent prohibition

170 (90.9%)

Temporary suspension

3 (1.6%)

Current employees or affiliates

14 (7.5%)

Permanent removal from office and
prohibition

7 (3.7%)

Temporary suspension from office/banking

7 (3.7%)

1
Calculations in this table exclude three prohibition actions that were brought against
appraisers because the nature of appraisers’ relationships with banks defies classification as
“former” or “current.”

Second, the Fed might fear that removals, particularly of senior
management, would jeopardize the franchise value of the bank. As critics
have pointed out, banks have historically been unusually insulated from
public scrutiny because regulators fear negative disclosure could, at
worst, trigger a run.162 In the 1980s, Fed officials argued against proposals
to publicize removal orders by claiming that “disclosures could have a
disruptive effect on a bank’s funding or overall financial condition,
thereby potentially aggravating a delicate situation that the supervisory
action was intended to correct.”163 To avoid shaking public confidence,
the Fed may thus choose not to force a change in management, preferring
to wait until after the individual and the bank have severed ties to initiate
sanctions.
Finally, the Fed may rely on informal mechanisms or threats to cause
removals of sitting employees.164 For instance, according to the Wall

162

See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 293, 307
(2012) (asserting that “it is hardly an exaggeration to say that federal banking policy during
most of the twentieth century was affirmatively hostile to the notion of bank transparency”).
163
Statement by J. Charles Partee, supra note 161, at 426; accord Korff, supra note 85, at
604 (explaining that a removal action could aggravate a weak bank’s condition because
“[p]ublicity of mismanagement would shake public confidence in the institution and raise
doubts about the soundness of the entire industry, eventually resulting in a [bank run]”).
164
For a helpful overview of the Fed’s informal enforcement tools, see generally Office of
the Inspector General, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Bureau of
Consumer Finance Protection, The Board Can Enhance Its Internal Enforcement Action
Issuance and Termination Processes by Clarifying the Processes, Addressing Inefficiencies,
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Street Journal, the OCC “effectively forced out” two top Wells Fargo
executives in 2018 by privately sending them individual rebukes.165 The
Fed’s 2018 cease-and-desist order against Wells Fargo was accompanied
by an announcement that, “[c]oncurrently with the [Fed’s] action,” Wells
Fargo would replace four directors by the end of the year.166 And back in
2008, Fed officials, along with the Secretary of the Treasury, reportedly
“threatened to remove the board and management of Bank of America” if
they caused Bank of America to back out of a deal to purchase the
embattled Merrill Lynch.167 Anecdotally, industry attorneys report that
the Fed and other bank regulators can exert and do exert pressure on banks
to change the composition of senior leadership including board members.
Informal tools have practical advantages over formal enforcement
actions, at least from the Fed’s point of view. They are less open and thus
less likely to negatively impact firm reputation or disrupt financial
markets. There are also no limits on the types of misconduct that can be
addressed, no requirements for hearings, and no opportunity for
appeals.168
The scope of the removals in our dataset was strikingly monotonous.
Every order to permanently remove a sitting employee was issued
simultaneously with an order of prohibition. Every prohibition order
contained sweeping language, barring the individual from “participating
in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of any [federally insured
banking] institution or agency” without prior approval from the

and Improving Transparency 11 (2019) (discussing mechanisms for informal enforcement
such as MOUs, Board resolutions, and commitment letters).
165
Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Regulators Weigh Executive Shakeup as CEO Heads to
Washington, Wall St. J. (Mar. 11, 2019, 11:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
washington-wants-to-know-why-timothy-sloan-hasnt-fixed-wells-fargo-11552316533
[https://perma.cc/KRU9-5ZVG].
166
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Responding to Widespread
Consumer Abuses and Compliance Breakdowns by Wells Fargo, Federal Reserve Restricts
Wells’ Growth Until Firm Improves Governance and Controls. Concurrent with Fed Action,
Wells to Replace Three Directors by April, One by Year End (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/enforcement20180202a.htm
[https://perma.cc/S92H-CE4J].
167
Robert Kuttner, Betting the Fed, Am. Prospect, June 2009, at 33, 34.
168
For a thoughtful explanation of the mechanics of bank supervision, including the ongoing
communication of informal supervisory directions by bank supervisors, and discussion of the
opacity inherent to that process, see generally Tarullo, supra note 16. As Professor Tarullo
notes, the nature of the supervisory process limits the ability of outside researchers to assess
the effectiveness of supervisory tools. Id. at 17, 62–63.
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appropriate banking supervisor.169 We were surprised to find, however,
that this has not always been the case. Descriptions of prohibition from
the early 1980s were relatively bespoke. An order from 1981, for instance,
removed and then prohibited a bank’s president from any further
participation in that same bank.170 Several orders from 1985 banned
individuals from working at any banking institution for just periods of
between two and three years.171 The shift from flexibility to monotony
can be partially explained by FIRREA, in which, as noted earlier,
Congress banned removed individuals from further participation in the
industry.172 But the Fed retains authority to waive or modify this ban,
though it has rarely exercised this power.173 We explore the question of
why not—particularly given that Fed officials often decry removal’s
“draconian” consequences—in Part III below.
Our data also confirm familiar post-2008 narratives that corporate-suite
executives almost never face punishment for wrongdoing.174 Of the
removal orders issued by the Fed, 56.3% (107 of 190) sanctioned a lowerlevel bank employee like bank tellers, loan officers, vice presidents,
branch managers, credit managers, and investment advisers. Senior
bankers, by contrast, make up a much smaller fraction of overall
removals: individuals at or above the executive vice president level were
targets of 24.2% of enforcement orders (46 of 190), and non-executive
board members were targets of only 9.5% (18 of 190). Nine (4.7%) of the
remaining orders sanctioned other types of bank affiliates, such as
appraisers, shareholders, and independent consultants.175 Another ten
169
Prohibition Ord., Roslyn Y. Terry, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 08-016E-I (Aug. 29, 2008) (emphasis added). This language appears in every permanent removal
order in our dataset. See Removal Orders, supra note 11.
170
See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., supra note 113, at 47.
171
See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Annual Report on Formal Enforcement
Actions 38, 40–41 (1985) (on file with author).
172
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 10173, § 904, 103 Stat. 183, 457 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818) (amending § 8(e)(1) of the FDIA).
173
Id.
174
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
175
In one instance, the Fed issued a temporary suspension order against a controlling
shareholder and former director of a bank whose involvement with the bank was connected to
the mob. See Consent Notice of Prohibition, Kenneth M. Matzdorff, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 04-020-G-I (Aug. 23, 2004), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/press/enforcement/2004/200408242/attachment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83TXX6TS]; Feds Ban Matzdorff from Bank Dealings, Kan. City Bus. J. (Aug. 26, 2004, 3:55 PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2004/08/23/daily30.html
[https://perma.cc/VP83-YPSL] (reporting allegations that Matzdoff “acted as a front man” for
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(5.3%) orders provided only vague descriptions of the sanctioned
individual.
Peeling the onion reveals a stark shift in how the Fed has used its
removal power over the past thirty years—from primarily punishing
senior executives and directors to rank-and-file employees. The basic
story is reflected in Figure 3 below.
As Figure 3 illustrates, the removal power was used against only a
handful of lower-level bank employees in the first ten years of our dataset.
From 1989 to 1998, around one-fifth (22.4%, or 15 of 67) of the Fed’s
removal orders sanctioned a lower-level employee. During the same
period, more than half (52.2%, or 35 of 67) of removal actions sanctioned
individuals at or above the executive vice president level, including nonexecutive board members. In short, in the early years of our dataset, the
removal power was overwhelmingly used to hold bank leadership
accountable.
Figure 3: Number of Removal Actions by Affiliation, 1989–20191

1
Excludes ten § 1818(e) orders for which the affiliation of the sanctioned individual to the
bank is vague or omitted.

organized crime and that the bank was a key part of a criminal scheme). Because it is unclear
whether the individual had a role at the bank beyond the use of his name, we coded this case
as involving an “Other” type of bank affiliate.
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Over time, however, lower-level employees have come to dominate
Fed enforcement. The percentage of removal orders against senior
bankers declined steeply from 52.2% between 1989 and 1998 to 21.8%
between 1999 and 2008 (12 of 55) and then rose to 25% between 2009
and 2019 (17 of 68). Conversely, the percentage of orders against lowerlevel bank employees rose from 22.4% between 1989 and 1998 to around
75% during both 1999–2008 and 2009–2019 (41 of 55 and 51 of 68,
respectively). All twenty-one orders issued by the Fed between 2008 to
2009—during and immediately after the last financial crisis—affected
lower-level employees. Most recently, lower-level employees constituted
81.3% of the removal orders (13 of 16) issued in 2019.
It is possible that our data are skewed because the Fed
disproportionately relies on informal mechanisms or threats to sanction
bank directors and senior employees and uses formal removal actions
only for rank-and-file workers. This divergence may occur if, for instance,
the Fed perceives that community-based reputational sanctions erect
potent barriers to reemployment for bank leaders and thus render a formal
removal action unnecessary or excessively punitive. Even so, serious
questions remain, including whether informal (confidential) and formal
(public) removal mechanisms actually lead to similar outcomes for the
affected individuals and whether a dual-track approach to sanctioning
bank employees could undermine the Fed’s own legitimacy.176 It would
take analysis of currently nonpublic information to answer these
questions, but it is clear from the public data that the overwhelming
majority of Fed removal orders sanction lower-level bank employees.

176
Existing empirical studies exploring whether senior executives suffer reputational
consequences for misconduct yield mixed results. Compare, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff, D.
Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Consequences to Managers for Financial
Misrepresentation, 88 J. Fin. Econ. 193, 202 (2008) (finding that 92% of executives who are
identified in public filings as culpable for financial misrepresentation are fired, compared with
95.9% of culpable non-executives), with Leah Baer, Yonca Ertimur & Jingjing Zhang, Tainted
Executives as Outside Directors 9 (AAA 2018 Mgmt. Acct. Section Meeting, Working Paper,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991803 [https://perma.cc/
7VFC-V777] (reporting that 11% of CEOs who are named as defendants in settled securities
class action lawsuits continue to gain board seats in the three years following the lawsuit).
Most of these studies, moreover, examine reputational consequences following a public
announcement of the misconduct—for example, agency enforcement actions—which may not
be applicable when details about the misconduct are kept confidential. Cf. Roy Shapira, A
Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 12–14 (2015) (arguing
that market players systematically react inaccurately to corporate misconduct, so they rely on
information generated publicly through the legal system to calibrate reputational penalties).
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D. Organizational Complexity Problems
Table 2: Institution-Level Descriptive Statistics, 1989–2019

N

All
Actions

1989–
1998

1999–
2008

2009–
2019

190

67

55

68

73
92
20
5

21
34
12
0

15
28
8
4

37
30
0
1

$164,417
(894)
75
(78.1)
12.2
(10.9)
$15,488
(83)

$17,858
(66)
-

$1,081
(6)

$51,703
(1,011)
74.1
(73.1)
12.2
(10.1)
$4,867
(97)

$399,986
(67,092)
76.8
(80.1)
11.3
(11.7)
$38,275
(8,734)

50
71
47
22

35
22
9
1

11
22
21
1

4
27
17
20

Institution Type
Bank holding company
State member bank
National bank
Foreign subsidiaries
Assets and capital adequacy
Total assets (average,1 $ mil)
Risk-weighted assets ratio2
(average1)
Tier 1 capital ratio3 (average1)
Total equity capital (average,1
$ mil)
Total assets (count, by
group)
<$100M
$100M-$10B
$10B-$250B
>$250B

-

1

The numbers in parentheses represent medians.
Risk-weighted assets ratio is calculated as risk-weighted assets as percentage of total
assets. Data for risk-weighted assets was not reported prior to 1996.
3
Tier 1 capital is calculated as tier 1 capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. Data
for risk-weighted assets was not reported prior to 1996.
2

Table 2 presents summary statistics describing the full sample of
banking institutions associated with the orders in our database. The most
striking observation is that affiliates of community banks, defined as
banks having less than $10 billion in total assets,177 are removed far more
177
We recognize that fixing a single definition for community banks inevitably involves
some arbitrary line drawing. Throughout the period of study, the asset cutoff used by bank
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frequently than affiliates of larger banks. Across the full data sample, the
gap in the raw numbers is considerable (63.7% versus 36.3%). Between
1989 and 2008, the Fed pursued nearly three times as many removal
actions against affiliates of community banks than those of larger banks.
This difference vanishes after 2008, largely because the number of
removal actions involving banks with more than $250 billion in assets
rose sharply. While some might conclude this represents a reversal of the
earlier trend, we do not put great weight on the shift as an indicator of
heightened Fed focus on the largest banks because 16 of the 20
observations relate to employees of a single bank—Wells Fargo—and all
are for lending violations during the 2008 financial crisis.

regulators to define community banks has increased from $1 billion to $10 billion. Compare
Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Community Bank Supervision: Comptroller’s
Handbook 1 (2019) (“Generally, banks with assets of $10 billion or less are characterized as
community banks.”), with Letter from Sarah A. Miller, Dir., Ctr. for Sec. Tr. & Inv., to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 23, 2002),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70802/samiller1.htm#P78_10707
[https://perma.cc/
VA8R-XYBN] (“Community banks are generally defined as banks with less than $1 billion
in total assets.”); cf. Jeremy C. Kress & Matthew C. Turk, Too Many to Fail: Against
Community Bank Deregulation, 115 Nw. U. L. Rev. 647, 649 n.6 (2020) (surveying other
definitions for “community bank”).
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Figure 4: Percentage of FDIC-Insured Banks Whose Affiliates Were
Removed by Total Assets, 1989–20191

1

The black lines reflect locally weighted regressions, (known as LOWESS or LOESS)
calculated with a modest smoothing factor of 0.67. To calculate the relevant percentages, we
collapsed and treated as a single bank observation all § 1818(e) actions relating to affiliates
of a common bank for each year.

Drawing conclusions about where the Fed directs its attention grows
more complicated, however, when the frequency of removal actions is
judged in relation to the composition of the U.S. banking landscape. For
instance, the shrinking numbers of enforcement orders involving banks
with assets less than $100 million can largely be explained by the fact that
the prevalence of such banks declined by 68% between 1994 and 2015.178
Conversely, the near absence of removal orders against banks with assets
greater than $250 billion in the first ten years of the data may owe to the
fact that no such banks existed before 1996.179 Figure 4 plots banks whose
affiliates were removed as a percentage of the total number of FDICinsured banks in each asset category, along with a smoothed curved that
shows trends over time. As Figure 4 illustrates, the share of community

178

See Council of Econ. Advisers, Issue Brief, The Performance of Community Banks over
Time 4 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160810
_cea_community_banks.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5UY-7HA7].
179
Data on the assets of FDIC-insured banks are derived from Call Reports, which are
described in Section II.A.
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bank affiliates is remarkably low both in absolute terms (less than 0.2%)
and as compared to the percentage for larger banks. Although some
scholars have suggested a change in how the Fed approaches enforcement
against large banks since the financial crisis, we did not observe this
shift.180 The trends across all four asset categories appear fairly flat—and
more importantly, move in parallel—indicating that the Fed’s
Section 1818(e) enforcement has kept up with changes in the banking
population but its focus has not meaningfully changed.
Finally, Figure 5 segments the sanctioned affiliates of community and
larger banks. Professor Heidi Schooner has argued that directors of
smaller banks are easier targets for removal actions because they “are
more likely directly involved in management.”181 Scholars studying
individual prosecutions for corporate misconduct have long thought that
organizational complexity insulates high-level executives by diffusing
responsibility and obscuring fault.182 This is not to say that regulators and
prosecutors deploy different standards in smaller and larger banks, but
rather that individual accountability for senior management is harder to
obtain in larger institutions.183
Our findings support these hypotheses. As Figure 5 shows, the number
of removal actions against individuals at or above the executive vice
president level, including directors, decreases sharply as bank size
increases. To date, the Fed has never used Section 1818(e) to remove the
leadership of the largest U.S. banks.184 By contrast, 57.1% (60 of 105) of
removal orders associated with community banks involve misconduct by
CEOs, directors, and other senior managers.

180

See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 156 (arguing that the Fed has interpreted its jurisdiction and
enforcement authority more broadly since the 2008 financial crisis).
181
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Bank Boards: The Case for Heightened Administrative
Enforcement, 68 Ala. L. Rev. 1011, 1026 (2017).
182
See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 Va. L. Rev.
1789, 1824–26 (2015) (explaining that “organizational complexity can obscure fault [because
i]t may be quite clear that some employees and officers approved a misleading financial
statement, but sorting out who knew what and when, where dozens each signed the relevant
reports and statements, could be a frustrating if not impossible task”).
183
See id. at 1824–26; cf. Schooner, supra note 181, at 1025–26 (observing that “[o]fficers
and directors of small community banks are [currently] held to the same statutory standards
for administrative liability as the officers and directors of the largest international banks” but
arguing that “[t]his [parity] seems worthy of reconsideration”).
184
But see infra notes 296–300 and accompanying text (discussing the OCC’s removal of
former Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf).
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Figure 5: Number of Removal Actions by Affiliation and Bank
Total Assets, 1989–2019

Strikingly, the Fed did not remove upper-level managers even when it
removed multiple lower-level workers at the same bank within a short
span of years. As noted above, the Fed removed sixteen Wells Fargo
employees between 2009 and 2010—the highest number of
Section 1818(e) orders for a single bank in the dataset.185 All sixteen had
fabricated income documents in order to inflate the creditworthiness of
subprime borrowers, and some had taken actions to falsely suppress the
creditworthiness of other borrowers. Among the employees, the most
senior were six branch managers. But as we now know, these were not
isolated instances of fraud; they were instead symptoms of deeper
problems at the bank. Since at least 2003, senior executives at Wells
Fargo have cultivated an aggressive sales culture that pushed its
employees to engage in deceptive lending and sales practices.186 Last
185

See Enforcement Actions, supra note 153.
See Indep. Dirs. of Bd. of Wells Fargo & Co., Sales Practices Investigation Report 19–
27 (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investorrelations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EUT-AXT5] (detailing
Wells Fargo’s sales and management practices from 2003 to 2017); Emily Glazer, How Wells
Fargo’s High-Pressure Sales Culture Spiraled out of Control, Wall St. J. (Sept. 16, 2016, 3:10
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-wells-fargos-high-pressure-sales-culture-spiraledout-of-control-1474053044 [https://perma.cc/9A9F-EZGE] (reporting that “[q]uestionable
sales tactics” were “an open secret in Wells Fargo branches across the country” and bank
executives had noticed this behavior as early as 2009 or 2010).
186
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year, in response to revelations that more than 5,000 Wells Fargo workers
created more than two million unauthorized customer accounts, the OCC
finally prohibited John Stumpf, Wells Fargo’s CEO from 2007 to 2016,
from future participation in the banking industry.187 But the question
remains: Given evidence of widespread misconduct by Wells Fargo
employees in 2009 and 2010, should federal banking regulators have
forced a change at the top sooner?
Figure 6: Removal Actions Per Bank by Total Assets, 1989–2019

Wells Fargo is not the only repeat offender. Figure 6 shows the number
of affiliates sanctioned per bank throughout our sample time period.
Regions Financial Corporation is another clear outlier. The Fed pursued
removal actions against twelve Regions employees between 2014 and
2019 as well as one employee in 2006.188 In Regions’s case, the
employees were engaged in several different types of misconduct, ranging
from falsely inflating customers’ incomes on credit applications and other
lending violations to directing a Regions subsidiary’s business to a third
party in exchange for kickbacks. Of the thirteen enforcement orders, one

187

See infra notes 296–300 and accompanying text.
See Enforcement Actions, supra note 153. The Fed removed another former Regions
employee earlier this year. Consent Ord., Matthew Curtis, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv.
Sys. No. 20-010-E-1 (May 26, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
pressreleases/files/enf20200528a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7T9-ZG2E].
188
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prohibited Regions’s chief credit officer from future participation in
banking, and two prohibited executive vice presidents.189 All three senior
managers personally committed fraud. Specifically, they intentionally
misclassified loans that defaulted during the 2008 financial crisis, which
in turn caused Regions to overstate its financial results.190
E. Embezzlement and Lending Violations, but Not Failed Supervision
Figure 7 probes the reasons for removal in two ways. First, it displays
the primary misconduct type for all 190 removal orders. The alternative
approach “trims” the sample by collapsing and treating as a single
removal event any observations involving a common bank and identical
or obviously related fact patterns. Trimming mitigates the concern that
some wrongs are more likely to be committed by solo operators (e.g.,
embezzlement), while others are more likely to be committed by a group
of conspirators or be symptomatic of flawed corporate cultures (e.g.,
unsafe and unsound extensions of credit). At the same time, one downside
of trimming is that it treats enforcement actions directed at a widespread
scheme to defraud borrowers the same as one directed at a single rogue
loan officer. As Figure 7 shows, the results from the two approaches
follow roughly the same pattern, though with some variation in the exact
numbers.
The most common reason for removal was embezzlement or misuse of
funds (e.g., use of funds from the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program to
buy personal real estate). The Fed also frequently pursued removals for
customer-related account or lending violations (e.g., unauthorized or
unsound extensions of credit, or customer account record alterations), and
for self-dealing transactions (e.g., improperly participating in loans,
kickbacks, or other payments that resulted in self-benefit or benefit to a
189
See Consent Ord., Jeffrey C. Kuehr, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 20-010E-1
(June
25,
2014),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
files/enf20140625a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LHW-N5WT] [hereinafter Kuehr Consent Ord.];
Consent Ord., Michael J. Willoughby, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 14-018-EI (June 25, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/
enf20140625a4.pdf [https://perma.cc/U572-P4X8] [hereinafter Willoughby Consent Ord.];
Consent Ord., Thomas A. Neely, Jr., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. Nos. 14-020-EI; 14-020-CMP-I (Oct. 16, 2015), https://banking.alabama.gov/pdf/orders_removal/
FRB/FRBNeelyThomasAJr101615.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJV6-VNX5] [hereinafter Neely
Consent Ord.].
190
See Kuehr Consent Ord., supra note 189; Willoughby Consent Ord., supra note 189;
Neely Consent Ord., supra note 189.
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family member). Removals for deceiving regulators or management (e.g.,
taking actions that falsely enhanced the bank’s financial condition or
failing to comply with reporting obligations) are fairly uncommon.
Removals for failure to properly supervise and manage the bank are
vanishingly rare.
The most high-profile individuals to be sanctioned for poor oversight
in the dataset are David Cronin and Robert Ray.191 Cronin and Ray were
the treasurer and senior vice president, respectively, of Allfirst Financial
Inc., a subsidiary of an Irish bank.192 In 2002, Allfirst revealed that a rogue
currency trader had incurred and then concealed $691 million of losses.193
The ensuing investigation concluded that Cronin and Ray neither knew
about nor participated in the deception, but they oversaw the trader’s
activities and were “asleep at the switch.”194 The third removal order in
this category sanctioned Adam Koontz, a former CFO, director, and
officer of Fayette County Bank for, among other things, failure to
“properly supervise the lending practices of subordinate employees” and
to establish effective controls.195

191
In 2020, after the time period covered by the data, the Fed issued a prohibition order
against Andrea Vella, Goldman Sach’s former co-head of the Investment Banking Division
for the Asia Ex-Japan region, for “engag[ing] in unsafe and unsound practices” by failing to
ensure that a transaction with heightened underwriting risks was fully escalated within the
firm. See Consent Ord., Andrea Vella, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 20-001-EI (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/
enf20200204a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/77LB-MBZW]. Even though Vella directly participated
in structuring the deal, the Fed did not allege that he knew about the fraud that occurred in
connection with the transaction. See Matthew Goldstein, Goldman Sachs Banker in Malaysian
Fund Scandal Is Barred from the Industry, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/business/goldman-sachs-1MDB.html
[https://perma.cc/VKW2-JUT2].
192
2 Ex-Allfirst Officials Barred from Banking, Balt. Sun (Apr. 25, 2006),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2006-04-25-0604250322-story.html
[https://perma.cc/M7YQ-88B2].
193
Id.
194
Erik Portanger, Craig Karmin & Alessandra Galloni, AIB Report Finds Internal Failings;
Officials Are Fired; CEO Is Spared, Wall St. J. (Mar. 15, 2002, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1016096578238909000
[https://perma.cc/D4R3-J2LS];
accord Robert Little, Allfirst Treasurer Is Called the ‘Key Weak Link,’ Balt. Sun (Mar. 15,
2002),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2002-03-15-0203150271-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9T9F-V3RK] (describing Cronin’s alleged inaction despite receiving
warnings about trading irregularities).
195
Consent Ord., Adam D. Koontz, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 19-014-EI (May 13, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/
enf20190516a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XYN8-NL6R].
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The Fed appears to prefer sanctioning the institution rather than highlevel management when it comes to supervisory failure. Two cases in
particular stand out. The first involves Michelle Kennedy, the former
CFO of Hinsdale Bank & Trust. During 2014 and 2015, Kennedy
“engaged in improper accounting practices to conceal an unreconciled
balance of approximately $2.7 million,” and the Fed subsequently
prohibited her from banking.196 The Fed’s investigation found numerous
internal control deficiencies at Hinsdale, including the fact that an internal
audit committee knew about the unreconciled balance since at least 2008
but failed to address or investigate it until March 2015.197 But although
the Fed ultimately imposed a $1 million fine on Hinsdale and its parent
holding company, no sanctions were pursued against the individuals who
knowingly failed to supervise Kennedy.198 One of the Regions cases is
similar. Three executives were prohibited from banking for intentionally
misclassifying loans that defaulted, and the Fed, following a joint
investigation with the Alabama Department of Banking and the Securities
and Exchange Commission, found that senior Regions managers had
failed to timely review accounting controls, even though examiners had
warned them about lapses.199 But none of these executives were
sanctioned. Instead, the Fed imposed a $46 million fine on Regions
itself.200
The scope of harms addressed by the removal actions also varied. At
the low end of the spectrum, for instance, is Kenneth Coleman, who stole
$2,570 and $810 from PNC Bank and Mellon Bank, respectively.201
196
Consent Ord., Michelle A. Kennedy, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 18026-E-I (July 10, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
files/enf20180712a2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG9B-XK86].
197
See Assessment Ord., Wintrust Fin. Corp., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No.
19-006-CMP-HC (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
files/enf20190228a2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW5J-9JEJ].
198
Cf. id.
199
Consent & Assessment Ord., Regions Bank, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No.
14-017-B-SMB (June 25, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
files/enf20140625a3.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EG2-CAEB].
200
Id.
201
Order of Prohibition, Kenneth L. Coleman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No.
OCC-AA-EC-04-43 (Mar. 1, 2005), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/
enforcement/2005/200503012/attachment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5Z9H-MWV7];
Final
Decision, Kenneth L. Coleman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. OCC-AA-EC04-43 (Mar. 1, 2005), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20180712a2.pdf
2005/200503012/attachment.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z9H-MWV7].
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Another example is Rohit Bansal, a former Goldman Sachs employee,
who tried to impress his bosses by obtaining confidential reports from a
former coworker at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.202 The
actions associated with some of the highest reported losses were from
Allfirst ($691 million in concealed trading losses), BankBoston
International ($66 million due to embezzlement and fraud by a loan
officer), and Chemical Banking Corp. ($66 million due to concealed
trading losses).203 These figures of course do not include harms that are
difficult to quantify, such as the costs flowing from steering customers
into subprime products.
***
Ultimately, the removal power today has become unmoored from bank
management, the conduct for which Congress created the power in 1933
and expanded it in FIRIRCA and FIRREA. Removed individuals have
mostly been former tellers, traders, and branch managers, not senior
bankers. The reasons for removal are typically theft, self-dealing, or
concealment, not mismanagement. It is possible that other enforcement
tools in the Fed’s arsenal, particularly its cease-and-desist authority
against institutions, are picking up some of the slack.204 Even so, we
believe that such tools are imperfect substitutes for removal for reasons
that we discuss in the next two Parts.

202
See Ben Protess & Peter Eavis, Ex-Goldman Banker and Fed Employee Will Plead
Guilty in Document Leak, N.Y. Times (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/27/business/dealbook/criminal-charges-and-50-million-fine-expected-in-goldmannew-york-fed-case.html [https://perma.cc/GCU2-MYYP]; Consent Ord., Rohit Bansal, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No. 15-033-G-I (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20151105a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9KE-BPU3].
203
Removal Orders, supra note 11.
204
For instance, the Fed’s 2017 cease-and-desist order against BNP Paribas prohibited the
bank from re-employing individuals who were identified by BNP’s investigations as involved
in the underlying misconduct. See Cease & Desist Ord., BNP Paribas S.A., BNB Paribas USA,
Inc. & BNP Paribas Sec. Corp., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. Nos. 17-020-B-FB;
17-020-CMP-FB;
17-020-B-FBR;
17-020-CMP-FBR
(July
17,
2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20170717a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FKW-72EC].
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Figure 7: Number of Removal Actions by Reason for Removal, 1989–20191

1

Excludes sixteen § 1818(e) orders for which a description of the underlying misconduct
is vague or omitted.
The full dataset is “trimmed” by collapsing and treating as a single enforcement event any
observations involving a common bank and identical or obviously related fact patterns.
The following misconduct was included in the “Other” category: unsafe and unsound
practices in the preparation of appraisals (3 cases); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violation
(2 cases); BHCA violation (1 case); antibribery law violation (1 case); misdemeanor theft of
confidential information from the FRB (1 case); criminal charges for retaliating against a
witness and obstruction of justice (1 case); violation of an FRB cease and desist order (1
case); criminal charges for conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and credit card fraud (1 case);
and unsafe and unsound practice arising from a loan officer’s payments to a loan processor
who had the power to approve loans the officer originated (1 case).

III. A THEORY OF BANKER REMOVAL
This Part develops a theory of the banker removal power as a tool for
disciplining senior management. First, it examines the limits of
alternative mechanisms for aligning the interests of bank managers with
the public interest: traditional corporate governance measures, which
tighten the interests of bank leadership and bank shareholders, and
prudential or structural regulations, which restrict the menu of permissible
bank activities. Post-2008 crisis reforms have leaned heavily on both
mechanisms.
Second, it explains how the power to remove senior bankers serves a
distinct complementary function. Regulatory rules are inherently
incomplete because of the dynamism and complexity that characterize
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modern finance.205 Corporate governance reforms, although they focus on
the incentives governing how bank leadership exercises their discretion,
motivate executives to advance only the interests of shareholders.206
Neither can effectively reorient the incentives of bank officers and
directors toward the public interest, which is the function removal
performs.
A. Corporate Governance and the Misalignment Problem
Corporate governance is shareholder-centric. By the standard corporate
governance account, excessive risk taking and other corporate
misconduct are the result of managerial self-dealing.207 Mechanisms that
align investor and managerial interests reduce these agency costs and
deter harmful corporate activities. Developments that increase
shareholder sophistication and concentrate their voting power also
help.208 For example, since 2017, the three largest asset managers,
BlackRock Funds, Vanguard Group, and State Street Global Advisors,
have jointly owned more than 20% of shares in the S&P 500.209 Unlike
passive retail investors, these institutional actors are not afraid to put
corporate managers under close supervision and speak up when they are
dissatisfied with management’s performance.210 In fact, according to
205

Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 22, at 253.
See infra Section III.A.
207
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 312–13 (1976); Reinier
Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law 36 (2d ed. 2009) (observing that a core
objective of corporate law is to control “the conflict [of interest] between the firm’s owners
and its hired managers”). For a detailed account of how misaligned managerial incentives
contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, see, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 22, at 255–
66.
208
See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. Rev.
721, 726 (2019) (“[I]nstitutional investors now control a large majority of the shares of public
companies and have a dominant impact on vote outcomes at those companies.”). See generally
John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 2 (Harv.
Pub. L. Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3247337 [https://perma.cc/5U2U-PZE9] (describing the “Problem of Twelve,”
which is that “control of most public companies . . . will soon be concentrated in the hands of
a dozen or fewer people”); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting,
43 J. Corp. L. 493, 500–06 (2018) (arguing that the increasing concentration of the shareholder
base through the rise of institutional investors has “play[ed] a vital role in reducing agency
costs”).
209
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 208, at 732–33.
210
See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 263, 306–08 (2019); Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New
206
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Professors Zohar Goshen and Sharon Hannes, investors have become so
capable of fending for themselves that there is no longer any need for
public regulation of managerial behavior.211
Following the 2008 financial crisis, many reforms sought to increase
the stability of the financial system by improving the corporate
governance of banks. For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) requires banks above a
certain size to establish risk committees with “independent” directors.212
Other provisions of Dodd-Frank require all public corporations, including
banks, to submit their top executives’ compensation arrangements for an
advisory shareholder vote—an advisory “say on pay”213—and seek to
empower shareholders by authorizing “proxy access,” a mechanism that
reduces the cost to shareholders of electing their preferred directors.214
But as Professor Steven Schwarcz and others have shown, reforms that
rely on corporate governance improvements implicitly but incorrectly
assume “that the investors themselves would oppose excessively risky
business ventures.”215 The assumption is flawed because shareholders are
in fact rationally motivated to pressure management to increase leverage
and take more than the socially optimal amount of risk.216 While bank
investors stand to capture all of the profits from risks that pay off, they
are able to externalize much of the losses to third parties.217 These third
Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17,
43–51 (2019). Some scholars, however, have argued that large institutional investors,
particularly index funds, have the ability but lack the incentive to oversee management. See,
e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2029, 2035 (2019) (arguing that “index
fund managers have strong incentives to (i) underinvest in stewardship and (ii) defer
excessively to the preferences and positions of corporate managers”); Lund, supra note 208,
at 500.
211
Goshen & Hannes, supra note 210, at 271.
212
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 165(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1429–30 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
213
Id. § 951(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1899 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
214
Id. § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n).
215
See supra note 22 and accompanying text; Schwarcz, supra note 22, at 4.
216
See Schwarcz, supra note 22, at 4–5. Moreover, as Professor Robert Hockett argues,
financial market failure is often the product of “recursive collective action problems,” in which
private shareholders and their fiduciaries all act rationally to advance their self-interest but
these actions aggregate into a collectively calamitous outcome. As a result of this dynamic,
Hockett argues, strengthening relations between private sector principals and their fiduciaries
will do little to reduce systemic risk. See generally Robert Hockett, Are Bank Fiduciaries
Special?, 68 Ala. L. Rev. 1071, 1074–75 (2017).
217
See Schwarcz, supra note 22, at 4–5.
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parties include bank depositors and the government, most notably the
FDIC insurance fund that pays off depositors of failed banks.218 For
systemically significant banks, affected third parties may also include
other market participants, whose risks are increasingly interconnected,
and the ordinary workers impacted by a crisis in the real economy.219 The
crucial idea here is that bank investors can “privatize gains and socialize
losses,” so the privately optimal level of risk for investors is higher than
what is beneficial from the public’s perspective.220 Corporate governance
reforms that better align management and shareholders may thus even
exacerbate the incentives for excessive risk taking at banks.
In fact, a substantial body of empirical evidence suggests that investors
were actually the culprits that pressured banks to take on high risk before
2008, not the victims. For example, a 2012 study by Professors Andrea
Beltratti and Rene Stulz found that banks with more “shareholderfriendly” boards performed worse during the financial crisis.221 They
suggested that “shareholder-friendly boards positioned banks in ways that
they believed maximized shareholder wealth” before the crisis, such as
by encouraging investment in subprime securities, and these decisions left
banks “more exposed to risks that manifested themselves during the
crisis.”222 Deniz Anginer and his co-authors similarly found evidence
suggesting a causal link between “shareholder-friendly corporate
governance” at banks and risk taking, particularly for larger banks that
may benefit from a too-big-to-fail guarantee.223 Their results show that
large U.S. banks that had to add independent directors to their boards after
218
See Macey & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 97 (“FDIC insurance . . . gives the shareholders
and managers of insured banks incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking . . . [because]
bank shareholders are able to foist some of their losses onto innocent third parties. These third
parties are the healthy banks whose contributions to the FDIC pay off depositors of failed
banks, and ultimately the federal taxpayers whose funds replenish the federal insurance funds
when they are depleted.”). The existence of FDIC insurance also reduces the incentives of
bank creditors—who are mostly bank depositors—to control excessive risk taking by ensuring
that their funds are protected if the risks turn out poorly. See id. at 98; Bebchuk & Spamann,
supra note 22, at 257.
219
See Schwarcz, supra note 22, at 4–5 (“[R]isk-taking that causes the failure of a
systemically important firm could trigger a domino-like collapse of other firms or markets,
causing systemic externalities that damage the economy and harm the public.”).
220
Levitin, supra note 148, at 2030.
221
Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some
Banks Perform Better?, 105 J. Fin. Econ. 1, 1 (2012).
222
Id. at 2.
223
Deniz Anginer, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Harry Huizinga & Kebin Ma, Corporate
Governance of Banks and Financial Stability, 130 J. Fin. Econ. 327, 328 (2018).
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a 2004 stock exchange rule change disproportionately increased their risk
taking as a result.224 They concluded that because banks are supported by
a state-funded safety net, “the case for more shareholder-friendly
corporate governance at banks is much weaker than in the case of
nonfinancial firms.”225
Studies that examine other causes of the 2008 crisis have also observed
that, at bottom, investors were part of the problem. Lucian Bebchuk and
his co-authors have argued that the pre-crisis pay arrangements for bank
executives gave them excessive incentive to accept risk.226 They show
that, before the financial crisis, senior management of the largest U.S.
banks received a substantial portion of their compensation in the form of
common stock and stock options, which aligned the executives’ interest
with the banks’ shareholders.227 Because of the externality problem
described above, this alignment meant that the executives had excessive
incentives to take risk.228 Pursuing the cause of the crisis from a different
angle, Brian Cheffins has observed that shareholders chose not to
vigilantly monitor bank management during the early to mid-2000s
because banks delivered better shareholder returns than their nonfinancial
counterparts during that period.229 As we now know, the profits that
inspired shareholder complacency were generated from the aggressive
lending, securitization, and trading strategies that eventually contributed
to the 2008 crisis. These studies suggest that, even if investors did not
directly pressure management to accept higher risk, they were complicit
in setting managers’ incentives to achieve this result.
Today, the investor base of the largest financial institutions is
increasingly consolidated in the hands of institutional—rather than
human—investors, but this development only compounds the
misalignment problem. Indeed, before the 2008 crisis, large mutual funds
were prominent buyers of the mortgage- and asset-backed securities sold
by banks, driving demand for the financial products that later turned out
to be toxic.230 Institutional investors may have agency problems of their
224

See id.
Id. at 343.
226
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 22, at 262–66.
227
See id.
228
See id.
229
Brian R. Cheffins, The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks, and the Financial
Crisis, 16 Theoretical Inquiries L. 1, 33–36 (2015).
230
See Diya Gullapalli & Shefali Anand, Mutual Funds Willing to Risk Subprime Heat,
Wall St. J. (July 13, 2007, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
225
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own that, for a variety of reasons, tend to ossify or exacerbate the moral
hazard problem associated with bank investors. In the first place, while
the ordinary individuals who are the ultimate beneficiaries of mutual
funds, pension funds, and other institutional investors may have an acute
interest in the long-term health of the economy and thus want banks to
accept only the socially optimal level of risk, the money managers who
make decisions for the funds may not.231 Most money managers are
evaluated and compensated based on annual performance and,
consequently, may have personal incentives to pressure banks in their
portfolios toward riskier strategies that produce high short-term yields.232
Evidence shows, for example, that banks with higher institutional
ownership took on more risk before the 2008 crisis.233
A second, more under-appreciated factor is that institutional investors
may be indifferent to systemic risk—the risk of disruption to the stability
of the financial system as a whole and not just localized economic
distress. Because institutional investors, especially passive mutual funds,
compete against each other on the basis of relative performance, they have
no incentive to pursue benefits or avoid harms that will be equally shared
by their rivals.234 Any catastrophe from excessive systemic risk taking

SB118429132937465533 [https://perma.cc/ENB4-QFUA]; Alberto Manconi, Massimo
Massa & Ayako Yasuda, The Role of Institutional Investors in Propagating the Crisis of 2007–
2008, 104 J. Fin. Econ. 491, 492 (2012) (observing that “one private estimate puts these
institutional investors’ collective exposure [to securitized bonds] higher than that of banks”).
231
For a detailed account of agency problems within institutional investors, see generally
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863 (2013); Lucian
A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31
J. Econ. Persps. 89, 98–100 (2017); Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 210, at 2050–56 (conducting
an empirical analysis of stewardship activities undertaken by index funds and concluding that
stewardship decisions confirm an agency-costs theory of index fund manager incentives to
underinvest in stewardship).
232
In a study of over 4,500 U.S. mutual funds’ compensation contracts, the authors found
that most contracts tied manager pay to the performance of the fund advisor and that “[t]he
performance evaluation window ranges from one quarter to 10 years, with the average
evaluation window equal to 3 years.” Linlin Ma, Yuehua Tang & Juan-Pedro Gómez, Portfolio
Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, 74 J. Fin. 587, 588 (2019).
233
See David H. Erkens, Mingyi Hung & Pedro Matos, Corporate Governance in the 2007–
2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide, 18 J. Corp. Fin. 389,
390 (2012) (finding that “firms with more independent boards and greater institutional
ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period”).
234
See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 210, at 2057 (“Index fund managers thus have an
incentive to make their funds as attractive as possible, and to perform as well as possible,
relative to other index funds.” (emphasis added)); Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 231,
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would, by definition, affect competitor funds and be therefore harmless
to a fund’s relative performance. On the other hand, any investment in
reducing systemic risk would benefit rivals while simultaneously driving
up the fund’s own costs.235 Institutional investors thus face an inherent
collective action problem when it comes to monitoring systemic risk.236
Moreover, to the extent that a government-assisted rescue is more likely
in the event of multiple bank failures, institutional investors may even
favor taking on systemic risk rather than risks that are particular to a
standalone bank.237

at 97 (observing that, for fund managers, what matters “is not the absolute performance of the
investment manager, but its performance relative to alternative investment opportunities”).
235
See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 210, at 2057 (explaining that “[i]f the index fund
manager invests in stewardship that increases the value of a particular portfolio company, the
increase will be shared with all other investors in the company, including rival index funds
that replicate the same index”); Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 231, at 98 (concluding
that “for managers of index funds, a desire to improve relative performance would not provide
any incentives that could counter tendencies that the investment manager might otherwise
have to underspend on stewardship”).
236
See Armour & Gordon, supra note 23, at 60 (noting that “[s]ystemic risks will harm
[institutional investors’] competitors’ portfolios as well as their own, and so [their] incentives
to intervene will be muted”). John Coffee, however, has argued based on the Capital Asset
Pricing Model that “as the market becomes increasingly populated by diversified
[institutional] investors, these investors will focus primarily on systematic risk.” John C.
Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk 11–12
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 541/2020, 2021), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3678197 [https://perma.cc/79GZ-JWC5]; see also
Yesha Yadav, Too-Big-to-Fail Shareholders, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 587, 653–55 (arguing that
institutional shareholders have the capacity and financial incentive to monitor system-wide
risks). While we agree with Coffee that institutional investors are interested in disclosures
about systemic risk, we note that receiving information, unlike overseeing the portfolio
company or other forms of stewardship, is costless from the fund managers’ perspective, and
thus does not implicate the collective action problem described above.
237
See Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Too Many to Fail—An Analysis of TimeInconsistency in Bank Closure Policies, 16 J. Fin. Intermediation 1, 1 (2007) (finding that
“when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out
some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can
be acquired by the surviving banks”).
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B. Substantive Regulation and “Chasing the Greased Pig”238
In theory, substantive prudential regulation could correct the
misalignment between the interests of shareholders and the public.239
Unlike corporate governance mechanisms, which influence senior
bankers’ choices indirectly by focusing on their incentives, prudential
regulation directly addresses banking activities by “limit[ing] the choices
available to banks in order to preclude socially inefficient choices.”240 For
example, the Basel III Capital Accords (and related regulations) restrict
the amount of debt a bank can take on: banks must hold equity in ratio to
its risk-weighted assets.241 The “Volcker Rule,” enacted pursuant to the
Dodd-Frank Act, limits banks from engaging in high-risk proprietary
trading.242 Provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, now substantially
repealed, prevented commercial banks from affiliating with other firms
“engaged principally” in underwriting or trading in securities.243
Substantive restrictions can be implemented through enforcement actions
238

“[T]he frustrations of regulation evoke an image from rural contests from earlier days
where pigs would be coated with a thick layer of grease and locals would try to catch them,
looking foolish in front of large crowds as the slippery beasts escaped time and time again.”
Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Corporations, Wall Street, and the
Dilemmas of Investor Protection 5–6 (2016).
239
See Tarullo, supra note 23, at 8–9. We use “prudential regulation” in this Article to refer
to microprudential regulation—that is, regulation that is focused on the safety and soundness
of individual banks. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Remarks at the 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: Implementing a
Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation 2 (May 5, 2011),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HJ7L-ZXVY]. Since the 2008 crisis, there has been a recognition that
microprudential regulation needs to be supplemented by a macroprudential approach that
addresses threats to the stability of the system as a whole. Id. at 3–4. The removal power,
however, is firm-specific by nature and thus of limited relevance to the design of
macroprudential regulation.
240
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 22, at 280.
241
See Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with
Banking and What to Do About It 94–96 (2013).
242
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)). Section 619 is called
the “Volcker Rule” because it was first proposed by former chairman of the Federal Reserve,
Paul Volcker. Paul Volcker, Opinion, How to Reform Our Financial System, N.Y. Times (Jan.
30, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/opinion/31volcker.html [https://perma.cc/
TR9F-J5UB].
243
See Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 20, 48 Stat. 162,
188 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (repealed in part by Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113
Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.)).
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and supervisory guidance in addition to legislation and rulemaking. A
recent example of the former is the Fed’s 2018 cease-and-desist order
against Wells Fargo, which capped Wells Fargo’s balance sheet until the
bank remediated problems with its governance, risk management, and
compliance functions.244
In practice, however, substantive prudential regulation has fallen well
short of its goals. In fact, shortly before the 2008 financial crisis, most
banks reportedly “met or exceeded the highest regulatory capital
requirements . . . .”245 Regulatory capture and inattention no doubt play a
role in explaining why prudential regulation has not been more
successful.246 But the problems run deeper than that. The line between
socially inefficient and socially beneficial activities is impossible to draw
with precision.247 This difficulty is compounded by the “relentless
dynamism” of the modern financial ecosystem—the fast pace of
innovation and innate boom-and-bust cyclicality of banking.248 Designing
well-calibrated rules requires time for extensive investigation, data

244

Cease & Desist Ord., Wells Fargo & Co., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. No.
18-007-B-HC (Feb. 2, 2018).
245
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 2006 Annual Report 102 (2006); see also Natasha Sarin &
Lawrence H. Summers, Understanding Bank Risk Through Market Measures, 2016 Brookings
Papers on Econ. Activity 57, 70–88 (evaluating a range of financial market data and
concluding that banks have “become riskier in the postcrisis epoch”).
246
See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving
in to Wall Street, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283, 1390–1428 (2013) (offering an extensive argument
that “[b]oth before and during the financial crisis, leading banks exploited flawed incentives
and governance structures in regulatory agencies to encourage regulators to cater to their
interests”); Rich Spillenkothen, Notes on the Performance of Prudential Supervision in the
Years Preceding the Financial Crisis by a Former Director of Banking Supervision and
Regulation at the Federal Reserve Board (1991 to 2006), at 12–13 (May 31, 2010), http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-0531%20FRB%20Richard%20Spillenkothen%20Paper-%20Observations%20on%20the%
20Performance%20of%20Prudential%20Supervision.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RF3D-N584]
(observing that pre-crisis financial regulation reflected the flawed beliefs that “financial
markets were largely efficient and self-correcting” and that “the rationale for government
regulation of banks was principally to offset the moral hazard and subsidy stemming from the
support banks received from the federal safety net”).
247
See Tarullo, supra note 23, at 9 (observing that capital requirements “will necessarily be
somewhat imprecisely related” to actual risk incurred).
248
See Awrey & Judge, supra note 22, at 2307; Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark
and a Postscript Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation, 43 Hofstra L. Rev. 25,
27 (2014) (“[T]he nub of the [post-crisis] regulatory problem derives from the fact that
financial firms operate in a dynamic environment in which there are many unknowns and
unknowables, and state-of-the-art knowledge quickly obsolesces.”).
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collection, and analysis.249 During that time, the financial system
invariably changes, so rules often become stale even before they take
effect. Moreover, new rules inevitably lead to new risks as bankers find
new ways to get around them. For example, large, complex financial
institutions arbitraged leverage limits by temporarily moving mortgagebacked securities into special purpose vehicles that were held off balance
sheet.250 Faced with higher capital requirements, banks declared their
intention to “manage the hell out of [their regulatory capital ratios]” by
repackaging their assets to circumvent the requirements.251 Scholars have
long recognized that “[n]o set of ex ante rules, no matter how granular or
sophisticated, can satisfactorily tackle the problem of regulatory
arbitrage.”252
The increasing complexity of banks and bank holding companies also
contributes to the problem. Jacopo Carmassi and Richard Herring have
found, for example, that the average number of subsidiaries controlled by
the largest global banks roughly doubled—from 500 to over 1,000—
between 2002 and 2013.253 Non-traditional banking activities, such as
securitization and use of derivatives, have become a mainstay of modern
banks and have “increased both the number and types of connections that

249

See Awrey & Judge, supra note 22, at 2303; see also Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note
22, at 281 (observing that calibrating the appropriate level of capital is challenging because it
“requires not only an extremely sophisticated understanding of risk modeling, but also
intimate knowledge of the bank’s portfolio of contracts, securities, and other assets”).
250
Lehman Brothers, for example, used accounting techniques to remove liabilities from its
balance sheet in order to conceal its true leverage ratio and “to create a materially misleading
picture of the firm’s financial condition in late 2007 and 2008.” 3 Report of Anton R. Valukas,
Examiner, at 732–64, Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 433 B.R. 113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No.
08-13555), 2010 WL 11417471.
251
Tom Braithwaite, Banks Turn to Financial Alchemy in Search for Capital, Fin. Times
(Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/3c9e7822-202d-11e1-9878-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/9JYL-AY6B]; see also Thomas M. Hoenig, Why ‘Risk-Based’ Capital Is
Far Too Risky, Wall St. J. (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-risk-basedcapital-is-far-too-risky-1470957677 [https://perma.cc/KZN7-RGA8 (“Risk-based capital
schemes encouraged banks to use their financial engineering tools to increase leverage and
reported returns associated with artificially low risk-weighted asset classes.”).
252
Robin Greenwood, Jeremy C. Stein, Samuel G. Hanson & Adi Sunderam, Strengthening
and Streamlining Bank Capital Regulation, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 479, 522
(2017). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
Wash. U. L. Rev. 211, 216–36 (2009) (describing the growing complexity in financial markets
and explaining how complexity can create and exacerbate regulatory challenges).
253
Jacopo Carmassi & Richard Herring, The Corporate Complexity of Global Systemically
Important Banks, 49 J. Fin. Servs. Rsch. 175, 180 (2016).
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linked borrowers and lenders in the economy.”254 This growing
complexity increases, in turn, the costs incurred by bank regulators in
connection with locating, understanding, and correcting risks to bank
safety and soundness. Most straightforwardly, as banks grow in size,
cross borders, or become more interconnected, the resources needed to
gather and process information about potentially relevant risks increases
as well.255 Moreover, complexity increases the likelihood that regulators
must calibrate rules under conditions of uncertainty. Capital and leverage
requirements, for example, rely on models that draw upon historical asset
price performance and economic conditions. But these models cannot
account for unmeasurable risk: future events that cannot be understood in
probabilistic terms or “unknown unknowns.”256 More and more
complicated interactions among banks and other financial intermediaries
mean that most risks are now beyond what regulators’ models can
capture. As former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan writes, the
problem with prudential regulation “is that regulators, and for that matter
everyone else, can never get more than a glimpse at the internal workings
of the simplest of modern financial systems.”257
To be sure, some of prudential regulation’s shortcomings are the
product of fixable flaws with the rulemaking process. Roberta Romano,
for example, has argued for the imposition of mandatory “sunset” clauses
that would compel Congress to take a second look at financial
legislation.258 Her proposal aims to mitigate the problems of arbitrage,
254

Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Interconnectedness
and Systemic Risk: Lessons from the Financial Crisis and Policy Implications 2 (Jan. 4, 2013),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20130104a.htm
[https://perma.cc/48BT-4542].
255
See Awrey & Judge, supra note 22, at 2310.
256
Id. at 2311–12 (quoting Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 Va.
L. Rev. 411, 418 (2017)) (recognizing that “there are categories of things that might happen—
good and bad—that are simply beyond our collective imagination,” and discussing the
challenges such uncertainty present for regulation). For similar observations, see Steven L.
Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1441,
1466 (2016) (observing that countercyclical capital requirements may not be feasible because
it is “virtually impossible to know ex ante whether a financial cycle is rational or merely a
bubble”); Coffee, supra note 22, at 797 (“Economic shocks are rarely predictable[,] . . . [and]
they arrive with a suddenness that often outpaces the capacity of bureaucracies to respond
effectively.”).
257
Alan Greenspan, Dodd-Frank Fails to Meet Test of Our Times, Fin. Times (Mar. 29,
2011), https://www.ft.com/content/14662fd8-5a28-11e0-86d3-00144feab49a [https://perma.
cc/ZK5M-JZVW].
258
Romano, supra note 248, at 38–40.
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complexity, and uncertainty by adding a process for legislation to be
regularly updated.259 Along the same lines, Kathryn Judge and Dan
Awrey have recommended a decennial commission responsible for
investigating the resilience of the financial system as a whole, emergent
opportunities and threats, and the impact of recent regulatory reforms.260
Judge and Awrey also argue that it is a mistake for regulators to respond
to arbitrage behavior by designing more detailed and more complex rules,
as is often the case.261 Doing so “invites banks to find new, more bespoke,
and more complex ways” of evasion, which perversely causes the banking
system to become more complex.262
But none of these proposals offers a complete solution to the challenges
of prudential regulation, nor is a complete solution possible. Both the
standard principles of administrative law263 and interference by wellorganized interest groups264 assure that regulatory actions cannot keep
pace with the frenzied evolution of the banking industry. Most gimleteyed commentators—and even bank regulators themselves—recognize
that “[w]hile external regulation [of substance] has a role in fostering a
safe and sound banking system, this role is limited” and “increasingly
important[] are the incentive structures faced by private banking
agents.”265 Crucially, regulators must address senior bankers’ incentives
so that those incentives are aligned with public interests.

259

See id.
See Awrey & Judge, supra note 22, at 2350–53.
261
Id. at 2333.
262
Id.; see also Greenwood, Stein, Hanson & Sunderam, supra note 252, at 518 (arguing
that regulators should not respond to arbitrage behavior by “impos[ing] another rigid ex-ante
rule as a patch on the first” but should instead adjust their response after observing how banks
react to the initial rule).
263
For a description of the rulemaking and supervisory processes and how they can
introduce “significant status quo bias,” see Awrey & Judge, supra note 22, at 2316–21.
264
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1023
(2012) (attributing regulatory inertia to the influence of “a coalition of well-financed, tightly
organized business interest groups”); cf. Romano, supra note 248, at 40–41 (responding to
Coffee by noting that there are “highly organized and powerful interest groups on both sides
of financial regulation issues, and solutions appearing in crisis-driven legislation are often
policies that a range of those groups have advocated” (emphasis added)).
265
David T. Llewellyn, Some Lessons for Bank Regulation from Recent Financial Crises,
in Handbook of International Banking 428, 429 (Andrew W. Mullineux & Victor Murinde
eds., 2003); accord Schwarcz, supra note 22, at 21–23 (“Regulating substance therefore is
important, but it may be insufficient to control excessive corporate risk-taking that causes
systemic externalities.”).
260
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C. Removal: Reorienting Managerial Incentives
Direct regulation of banking activities alone will not prevent excessive
risk taking. As we have shown, crafting rules to generate the socially
optimal amount of bank risk taking is hard enough, without factoring in
capture, arbitrage, complexity, and uncertainty. At the same time,
corporate governance reforms, which seek to shape bank officers’ and
directors’ decision-making incentives, also miss the mark because they
align managerial incentives with investors’ interests only.
The removal power thus serves a distinct complementary function. It
provides a counterweight to shareholder-centered corporate governance
reforms by empowering the Fed (and other bank regulators) to reorient
bank managers’ incentives toward the public interest. The credible threat
of removal could enhance supervisory efficacy by ensuring that regulators
do not need to rely on bank executives whom they no longer trust.266 It
could also help close the “responsibility gap” in modern banking
conglomerates—the recognition that in large financial institutions, “the
buck still stops nowhere.”267 And no less importantly, it would restore the
balance—struck during the Civil War and restored during the Great
Depression—between the private shareholders, the managers who run
banks, and the public sovereign that charters banks and permits them to
conduct their core business of expanding the money supply.268
To realize this latent capacity, however, Congress must sharpen the
removal power’s role in bank regulation. As Part II demonstrates, the
Federal Reserve currently uses the removal power primarily as a tool to
ensure that all bankers, including rank-and-file employees, comply with
certain standards of behavior. In other words, the removal power currently
serves a professional regulation function: it is used to enforce a set of
266
See, e.g., Baxter & Ramasastry, supra note 149, at 100 (“[S]upervisors rely on the bank’s
management to inform them about problems and managerial challenges. If supervisors were
to independently verify each and every fact, the bank examination process would never end.”);
Foreign Bank Supervision and the Daiwa Bank: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Inst.
& Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 8 (1995) (statement
of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.) (“The whole system
of supervision also proceeds upon the basis of trust . . . .”).
267
Samuel W. Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, 12 Crim. L. & Phil. 471,
473 (2018); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Remarks on
Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of Law (Sept. 17, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-remarks-financial-fraudprosecutions-nyu-school-law [https://perma.cc/D7N2-3VQM]; see also supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
268
See supra Section I.A.
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basic standards of professional membership and to exclude persons who
are deemed unqualified.269 Professional regulation has a decidedly
individualistic cast. The enforcement focus is on the individual actor and
imposing individual punishment rather than improving overall
organizational functioning.270 Professional regulation thus embodies a
“bad apple” theory of corporate wrongdoing. Tellingly, as shown above,
the majority of Section 1818(e) actions pursued by the Fed since the mid1990s have sanctioned rank-and-file bank employees for one-off conduct,
such as embezzlement, that has little, if any, impact on systemic
administration.271 Used in this narrow way, the removal power produces
a sort of government-run “shame list”—a tool that bank executives and
their lobbies have repeatedly sought as a means to facilitate their hiring
practices.272
These observations about how the Fed now uses its removal authority
leaves still more questions about why it has made this choice. One
explanation is that the Fed is legally constrained, resource constrained,
and poorly motivated to pursue a different approach.
First, while the removal power exists today at its broadest scope in
terms of who may be removed and the amount of discretion in the Fed’s
hands, there are nevertheless significant limits. In particular,
Section 1818(e) requires proof of culpability, defined as “personal
dishonesty” or a “willful or continuing disregard . . . for the safety or
soundness” of the institution.273 According to many bank regulators, this
requirement broadly insulates directors and officers of large banks from
liability for corporate misconduct because they can credibly deny

269
See Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1998) (observing that
professional regulation is premised on the belief that the profession “cannot responsibly be
entered at will but only in compliance with a specified, and usually, exacting protocol and
upon proof of competence”). Moral character and fitness, in particular, “as a professional
credential has an extended historical lineage.” Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a
Professional Credential, 94 Yale L.J. 491, 493 (1985).
270
Cf. Rhode, supra note 269, at 508 (describing a goal of the professional regulation of
lawyers as “exclud[ing] individuals with ‘unsavory characters’ or traits ‘not appropriate’ for
practitioners, and to deter those with ‘obvious’ problems from seeking a license”).
271
See supra Part II.
272
William Dudley, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, expressed
interest in creating such a government-run list. See Ian Katz, Wall Street Mulls Naughty List
for Ethically Challenged Bankers, Bloomberg (Dec. 22, 2015, 5:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/wall-street-mulls-naughty-list-forethically-challenged-bankers?sref=C8Sr7Rk8 [https://perma.cc/T3X9-PWB6].
273
12 U.S.C. § 1818(e).
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knowledge of most operational details.274 The challenge of attributing
fault increases with the distance from the relevant misconduct,
particularly when it comes to issues involving financial risk, which is
extraordinarily complex to measure.
There is undoubtedly some truth to this diagnosis, but the real story is
likely also more complicated. There have been instances where highranking executives’ action (or inaction) falls short of conscious
complicity—for example, if they fail to prevent a problem that they have
no reason to suspect existed. But there are also plenty of bank scandals in
which management was surely aware of but ignored the oversized risks.
Wells Fargo’s sales practice problems persisted since 2002, over a decade
before the accounts scandal broke in 2013.275 JP Morgan’s internal risk
limits were breached 330 times during the quarter when the disastrous
“London Whale” trades happened.276 In situations like these, a unitary
knowledge requirement operates not so much to tie the Fed’s hands as to
substantially raise the cost of removing bank leadership relative to lowerechelon subordinates.277
The bias in favor of targeting those at the lower levels is aggravated by
time and resource constraints. The Fed has to pick its fights and weigh the
manpower and funding involved in pursuing a removal case against its
benefits.278 At the bank examiner and enforcement staff level, capacity
may also depend on their ability to convince agency leadership and the
274

See OIG Report, supra note 142, at 20–21.
See Consent Ord., John Stumpf, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency No. AA-EC2019-83 , at 3 (Jan. 22, 2020); see also Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with Wells
Fargo, New Yorker (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/therecord-fine-against-wells-fargo-points-to-the-failure-of-regulation [https://perma.cc/57F2EPUQ] (noting that account fraud “was so widespread [at Wells Fargo branches] around the
country that it would be a truly remarkable coincidence if each team member had come up
with the strategy independently”).
276
Majority & Minority Staff of S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., 113th Cong., Rep. on JPMorgan Chase Whale
Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses 7 (Comm. Print 2013),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/REPORT%20%20JPMorgan%20Chase%20Whale%20Trades%20(4-12-13).pdf [https://perma.cc/7STC5EMG].
277
In particular, the traditional method of proving the awareness of those at the top is to
“fli[p]” those at the bottom and go up the ladder. See Rakoff, supra note 1; Coffee, supra note
1, at 77 (observing that this process is particularly challenging in the deeply hierarchical
structure of large corporations); Eisinger, supra note 1, at xx, 3–4, 13–19 (describing the
arduous effort of flipping mid-level Enron employees to secure the conviction against Kenneth
Lay and Jeffrey Skilling).
278
See OIG Report, supra 142, at 24.
275
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public that they are doing an effective job. That is, “[o]btaining credit and
public approbation is a precondition to enhanced future funding.”279 In
turn, this need to claim victories exerts pressure on enforcement personnel
to reach quick settlements; to prefer easy cases, such as those involving
obvious self-dealing, to complex ones that require intensive
investigations and could possibly be reversed on appeal; and to prioritize
extracting corporate fines and reforming corporate policies, which rarely
encounter resistance, over punishing individuals.280
Finally, beyond law and resource considerations, a third factor is Fed
personnel’s own lack of motivation to leverage removal unless there was
extreme bad faith. A common critique from bank supervisors is that
removal is a draconian remedy that “tak[es] away” the “[l]ivelihood[s]”
of bankers whose careers in banking span years or even decades.281
Because of the recent practice that has equated Section 1818(e) with
imposing a lifetime ban from the entire banking industry,282 supervisors
perceive removal as an all-or-nothing proposition, a sledgehammer
instead of a scalpel. As a result, even to those officials who see the
problem as we do—banks are chartered to perform core public functions,
but the executives who run the banks have weak allegiances to the public
interest—removal seems like a blunderbuss response that may produce
unintended consequences.283
Further compounding internal political challenges with removing
management after major bank crises is the fact that the banking agencies
themselves were on the scene but often never noticed anything wrong
with the level of risk or types of activities they were supervising, except
in hindsight.284 The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s board of
279

Coffee, supra note 1, at 7.
See, e.g., id. at 7–9 (arguing that deferred prosecution agreements grew in popularity
because “they spared prosecutors from any risk of an embarrassing loss at trial, and they
offered a speedy resolution that enabled prosecutors and regulators to declare an early victory
(whereas a trial would potentially mean years of delay and then appeals)”); Eisinger, supra
note 1, at 228–43 (describing the risks, rewards, and incentive calculus that deterred
prosecutors from going after top executives at major banks).
281
OIG Report, supra 142, at 23.
282
See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
283
For a discussion of the unintended consequences of severe punishments against corporate
entities, see generally Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61
Stan. L. Rev. 271, 290–94 (2008) (arguing that corporations may respond to the threat of
severe sanctions by reducing their monitoring effort).
284
For examples of critiques suggesting that regulators enabled or encouraged corporate
misconduct, see, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 1 (explaining how “the government, writ large, had
a part in creating the conditions that encouraged the approval of dubious mortgages,” and
280
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directors even appointed Wells Fargo’s then-CEO to be its representative
on the Federal Advisory Council in 2014, a year after the fake accounts
first came to light.285 Fed personnel are certainly aware that any decent
defense lawyer to a senior bank executive would argue that if
blameworthy complicity occurred, it did not just stop at bank
management. To pursue a high-profile removal action is to invite critical
congressional and public scrutiny of the bank supervisors themselves.
Conscious or not, self-interest lurks in the background of enforcement
decisions.
These constraints—proving the legal elements, marshalling the
managerial resources, and overcoming agency problems within the Fed
itself—are significant but not intractable. To the contrary, the next Part
suggests two modest steps for the Fed and Congress, respectively, to take
toward enhancing the removal power. Our work builds on a substantial
body of literature that proposes binding senior bankers to the public with
fiduciary duty-like obligations and expanding corporate voting rights to
non-shareholder constituencies.286 Unlike these desirable mechanisms,
which may not be possible in the near future, an attractive feature of using
the removal power to re-align incentives is that the authority, for the most
part, already exists.
IV. REVIVING REMOVAL (AGAIN)
The previous Part argued that a credible threat of removal against bank
executives for unsound management practices is an indispensable
component of contemporary bank supervision. This Part makes the case
for modernizing removal in order to facilitate its ability to serve this
function. One set of recommendations is directed at the Fed and concerns
design of removal terms. A second set is directed to Congress and
arguing that this involvement is a reason for the lack of prosecutions in connection with the
2008 crisis); Eisinger, supra note 1, at 243 (speculating that the SEC declined to bring civil
charges against Lehman Brothers because it “was responsible for the investment bank[]” and
“had blown its oversight”).
285
Press Release, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F., John G. Stumpf Appointed to the Federal
Advisory Council (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.frbsf.org/our-district/press/newsreleases/2014/john-g-stumpf-appointed-federal-advisory-council/ [https://perma.cc/M7UYX6BG].
286
See supra note 23. Admittedly, there are downsides to relying on the existing regulatory
apparatus. Our proposals below, for example, would not resolve concerns about regulatory
capture. See, e.g., Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians, supra note 23, at 630–31;
Levine, supra note 23, at 40–41.
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addresses the need to recognize managerial and supervisory failure as a
distinct removal ground.
A. Terms of Removal
We begin with low-hanging fruit. The Fed ought to allow for more
variation within the terms of removal orders. Underlying the argument
that removal is too draconian is the assumption that the only possible
consequence of a removal order is a lifetime ban from the entire banking
industry.287 But as our data show, bank supervisors have authority to
vary—and in the 1980s did in fact vary—the scope, duration, and other
terms of removal. Section 1818(e) orders issued by the Fed from the early
1980s were bespoke—in some cases, banning the individual from the
banking industry for two to three years and, in other cases, banning the
individual from working at a particular institution.288 Other options for
intermediate penalties include restricting the size of the institutions where
an individual may work, restricting the types of positions the individual
may hold, or restricting the activities in which the individual may engage.
There is no question that the Fed still has the power to pursue these
removal options: FIRREA explicitly provides that the banking agency
issuing the Section 1818(e) order can also determine its scope.
Encouraging bank supervisors to pursue intermediate removal options
may sound counterproductive at first. Why weaken the removal power?
But as Professor Kenneth Culp Davis recognized half a century ago,
“insufficient individualizing” undermines just punishment.289 The reality
is that the harshest penalties are often least effective in deterring
misconduct because they are infrequently or inconsistently enforced.290 If
bank supervisors can circumscribe the prohibition terms according to the
type of wrongdoing at issue, rather than always imposing a lifetime
industry-wide ban, supervisors will be more likely to view the removal
power as an appropriate, proportionate sanction and therefore more likely
to use this authority. Making enforcement more likely but allowing for
intermediate options may also reduce the widespread perception that bank
supervisors engage in scapegoating—singling out a few lower-level
287

See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
289
Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 52 (1969).
290
See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1613, 1655
(2007) (noting that the “probability of sanction is at least as important as . . . severity of
sanction in determining the effectiveness of legal prohibitions in deterring violations”).
288
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workers for doing what senior executives directed or encouraged them to
do.291
We also do not mean to suggest that a lifetime ban from the banking
industry should be taken off the table. There are many circumstances that
could justify a severe sanction, such as cases involving recidivism,
pervasive fraud, or lying to regulators. Moreover, the possibility of a
draconian sanction could enable bank supervisors to obtain their preferred
removal terms in the most efficient way possible, just as prosecutors
derive their considerable advantage in plea bargaining from leveraging
“modern sentencing statutes [that] are extraordinarily harsh.”292
B. Failure to Supervise
Second, Congress should relieve the pressure to target rank-and-file
employees by recognizing managerial and supervisory failure as a
separate removal ground. The legal standards for removal currently do
not distinguish between senior officers, directors, and lower-level
employees, even though the roles of bankers vary dramatically along the
hierarchical structure.293 Whereas it makes sense to ask whether lowerlevel employees knew their actions were illegal, excessively risky, or
otherwise wrongful, it makes less sense to ask whether senior bank
executives and directors consciously participated in the same way given
the decentralized structure of many modern banks. This is because the
duties of senior bank officers and directors are not related to carrying out
operational details; they are instead to oversee institutional risk taking: to
establish a corporate culture that makes excessive risk taking by rankand-file employees unlikely—or at least unrewarded—and to ensure that
adequate information about the bank’s risk exposure reaches those at the

291

See Garrett, supra note 182, at 1794–95 (noting that because culpable individuals are
frequently identified based on information provided by the corporation, “[t]he higher-ups, who
may control negotiations with prosecutors, may themselves remain above the fray while
lower-level employees are ‘thrown under the bus’”).
292
David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 473, 488 (2016); accord Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea
Bargaining, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 1303, 1312 (2018) (“[B]y threatening a seriously inflated set
of charges and then offering to replace it with the charges that she truly desires, the prosecutor
is able to control the defendant's incentive to plead guilty, and with it the outcome of any
subsequent ‘negotiation.’”).
293
See supra Section III.C.
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top.294 Thus, removal of bank executives or directors should turn on an
objective assessment of whether the supervisory arrangements that they
put in place were adequate, rather than whether they knew that
wrongdoing was afoot.295
As an initial matter, some might object to the premise that the need to
prove that a high-level executive acted “willfully” presents a problematic
mismatch between the legal framework and the realities of executive
responsibility in the banking industry today. They may contend that a
reasonably aggressive regulator would have no difficulty establishing the
culpability of bank leadership who was truly asleep at the switch. The
OCC’s Section 1818(e) action against Wells Fargo’s former CEO,
Stumpf, in January 2020 might seem to support this argument at first
glance.296 The prohibition rested on Stumpf’s alleged failure to
adequately discharge his supervisory responsibilities, inform himself
about the bank’s condition and controls, and respond to warning signs
about illegal sales practices.297 Yet in many ways, the allegations against
Stumpf prove the problem with current law, as the primary claims of
failed oversight were also accompanied by secondary allegations of
deliberate inaction and even direct participation in the wrongful conduct.
The consent order, for instance, noted that sales practice problems existed
in Wells Fargo’s community bank division “[f]rom at least 2002,” when
Stumpf himself led the division.298 Moreover, the misconduct at Wells
Fargo was extreme: in the aftermath of the account scandal, “nearly every
one of the bank’s business lines [wa]s under investigation by a
government agency.”299 In turn, Wells Fargo’s regulators—the Fed and
the OCC—faced unprecedented political pressure to use their

294
See Proposed Guidance on Supervisory Expectations for Boards of Directors, 82 Fed.
Reg. 37,219, 37,224–26 (Aug. 9, 2017); Proposed Supervisory Guidance, 83 Fed. Reg. 1351,
1356–57 (Jan. 11, 2018) (proposing guidance on the core principles of effective senior
management).
295
Cf. Tarullo, supra note 23, at 16 (discussing the regulatory benefits of “strengthening of
systems of controls and risk-appetite decision processes” at banks); Rakoff, supra note 1
(discussing the challenges of proving intent and asking whether “if, despite . . . reports of
suspicious activity, the executive failed to make such inquiries, might it be because he did not
want to know what such inquiries would reveal?”).
296
See Consent Ord., John Stumpf, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency No. AA-EC2019-83, at 3 (Jan. 22, 2020).
297
See id. at 2–4.
298
Id. at 3.
299
Glazer, supra note 165.
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Section 1818(e) authority to punish the bank’s leadership.300 Hence, it
would be a mistake to view the OCC’s action against Stumpf as more than
a deviation from the norm driven by a particular mix of political
expediencies and an egregious set of facts.
A more substantial objection to adding supervisory failure as a separate
ground for removal is that it is in tension with contemporary corporate
governance trends toward recognizing that basic questions about
oversight responsibilities—such as which matters should be brought to
the attention of corporate leaders or how deeply or broadly we expect
those leaders to monitor—eschew universalizing. “Caremark was wise to
demand almost nothing beyond asking that some compliance system
exists,” writes Professor Donald Langevoort, referring to the corporate
law doctrine governing the board of directors’ oversight obligations.301
So-called Caremark claims against corporate directors are notoriously
hard to prove, requiring plaintiff-shareholders to show that the directors
either utterly failed to implement an information and reporting system to
allow the board to monitor the corporation or consciously failed to
supervise the systems’ operations.302 To Caremark’s defenders, the
doctrine’s minimalism reflects a welcome appreciation for the messy
realities of oversight, in which the adequacy of supervisory arrangements
depends on context, rests heavily on assessments about uncertainties and
contingencies, and should therefore be treated as a matter of business
judgment.303 Assessing claims that bank directors failed to supervise can
300

See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren, supra note 14; Victoria Guida, Waters Calls
on Regulators to Consider Ousting Wells Fargo CEO, Politico (Mar. 12, 2019, 3:51 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/12/waters-remove-wells-fargo-ceo-1263665
[https://perma.cc/4GSR-Z8TH].
301
Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 Temp.
L. Rev. 727, 729–30 (2018).
302
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). Caremark itself remarked that
oversight liability “is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a
plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d
959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
303
See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 301, at 729 (“As many corporate governance scholars
have come to accept, corporations are complex interactive systems of processes, routines, and
feedback . . . .”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J.
Corp. L. 967, 981–85 (2009) (arguing that “courts need to be especially sensitive in applying
Caremark” to claims alleging risk management failures (as compared with legal compliance
failures) because of the complexity and uncertainty inherent to risk management); Robert T.
Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 47, 81 (2010) (describing the “highly sophisticated exercises” involved in risk
management and arguing that those exercises are “necessarily business judgments”).
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involve second guessing operational structure, organizational priorities,
and resource allocations, which most corporate law scholars agree are best
left to bank leadership to manage.304 Simply put, excessive interference
with the discretion of senior executives runs a real risk of impeding
corporate wealth-producing capacities.
Yet this concern applies less well in the banking context, where wealth
production is a secondary goal to providing critical money and payments
infrastructure for the economy. Caremark is undergirded by the belief that
directors are sufficiently motivated to exercise their judgement to further
the interests of shareholders, who elected them.305 Following Caremark
in the banking context would undermine the goal of removal law: forcing
senior bankers and directors to consider the harms of corporate actions on
society at large.306
More critically, even if regulators set a minimal threshold for adequate
supervision with limited policing of effectiveness, recognizing failed
supervision as a removable offense could yield at least two important
benefits. First, the addition could improve the current legal framework by
expanding the inquiry. For top bank executives and directors, searching
for their awareness of wrongdoing skips over a crucial question: Did the
executives or directors try to be brought into significant risk and
compliance matters? Did they establish routes by which operational-level
conditions and problems can promptly reach their attention? Broadening
the frame of inquiry in this way would enable supervisors to move away
from the current focus on who knew what about particular misconduct.
When senior leaders fail to receive or properly respond to material
information, it could be a symptom of poor leadership capacity—Stumpf,
304

See Miller, supra note 303, at 98–100 (arguing that it would be “absurd” to think that
courts have the capacity to specify risk management or measurement models); Langevoort,
supra note 301, at 738 (noting that, to many scholars and practitioners, “Caremark’s legacy of
minimalism and deference is to be celebrated—private ordering will do better at getting
compliance responsibilities to the right place”). See generally William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs
& Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware
Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem,
96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 449, 451–52 (2002) (describing the justifications for the corporate law
principle of “business judgment” deference to senior management and directors). But see
Frank Partnoy, Delaware and Financial Risk, in The Corporate Contract in Changing Times:
Is the Law Keeping Up? 130, 131, 133–35 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart
Thomas eds., 2019) (arguing that judicial competence concerns surrounding general business
risk do not apply to financial risk).
305
See Langevoort, supra note 301, at 734.
306
Cf. id.
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for example, “was not perceived within Wells Fargo as someone who
wanted to hear bad news or deal with conflict”307—or systematic
obstacles—as in the case of Michael Corbat, who had repeatedly failed to
put in place “effective risk management” during his tenure as Citigroup’s
CEO.308 Cabining the removal inquiry to a search for awareness of one
instance or even one type of harm inevitably leads regulators to overlook
these deeper problems.
Second, recognition of supervisory failure as a basis for removal could
open up an important avenue for clarifying senior bankers’ expected
responsibilities. The Fed has said, for example, that the “core” duties of
bank directors include overseeing the bank’s risk levels and overseeing
its management.309 Yet the current approach to the removal power all but
ensures that directors who neglect these responsibilities will not be
disciplined by the Fed, which in turn has impoverished critical analysis
on the scope and substance of the Fed’s expectations on this front.310
Failure to acknowledge weak supervision as a basis for removal, in other
words, makes it difficult to develop a granular account of the proper
bounds of bank directors’ oversight and risk-management roles. This
lacuna also creates confusion about the interplay between state corporate
law and federal banking regulation with respect to bank governance,
particularly concerning whether the Fed serves a primary or secondary
role in promulgating guidance for bank boards.311 Against this backdrop,
307

Independent Directors of the Board of Wells Fargo & Company Sales Practice
Investigation Report 53–54 (2017), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/
investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV69-NLNW].
308
Emily Flitter, Citigroup Is Fined $400 Million Over ‘Longstanding’ Internal Problems,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/07/business/citigroup-finerisk-management.html [https://perma.cc/GHS8-GGLP].
309
See Proposed Guidance on Supervisory Expectations for Boards of Directors, 82 Fed.
Reg. 37219, 37224–26 (Aug. 9, 2017).
310
Admittedly, the Fed annually rates supervised banks’ and bank holding companies’
“ability to monitor and manage all risks,” which takes into account the effectiveness of a
bank’s senior management and board as one of many other factors. See Bank Holding
Company Rating System, 69 Fed. Reg. 70444, 70445–46 (Dec. 6, 2004); Proposed Guidance
on Supervisory Expectations for Boards of Directors, 82 Fed. Reg. 37219, 37,220 (Aug. 9,
2017) (explaining that board effectiveness would be assessed in connection with the proposed
Large Financial Institution (LFI) rating system).
311
Cf. Letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Vice President, Ctr. for Cap. Mkts.
Competitiveness, to Ann E. Misback, Sec’y, Fed. Rsrv. Bd. of Governors (Jan. 5, 2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2018/January/20180129/OP-1570/OP1570_010518_131935_521010752079_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7PG-4YEY] (asking the Fed
to clarify that its “role in the corporate governance of banking organizations is secondary to
that of state law and the SEC”).
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the rare removal actions that involve inadequate oversight are easily
dismissed by banks as unprincipled or the product of political
expediencies.312 One benefit of recognizing supervisory failure is that it
scaffolds more rigorous development of bank leaders’ oversight
responsibilities and information flow requirements.
Finally, determining what qualifies as failed supervision warranting
removal will no doubt be challenging. This decision will depend heavily
on the particular facts and circumstances, including, for example, the
effectiveness of structures the relevant executives implemented to
manage risk and information flows, the thoroughness of their responses
when risks to bank safety and soundness were detected, and the extent to
which they contributed to or ignored an organizational culture of
excessive risk tolerance. It is beyond the scope of this Article to delineate
precisely what adequate supervision requires, but we recognize that the
judgment-laden nature of this determination could raise concerns about
manageability. Broad discretion, however, is characteristic of bank
oversight. The banking agencies are given wide latitude in carrying out
virtually all aspects of their duties, including discretionary authority to
assess whether “banks’ risk management systems are, in fact, identifying,
measuring, monitoring, and controlling risks”313 and authority to set the
minimum level of capital for a banking institution “in light of the
particular circumstances of the banking institution.”314 Incorporating
failed supervision as a basis for removal contributes little to changing the
fundamentally discretionary nature of bank oversight, but it would greatly
assist the Fed and others in fulfilling the role Congress has assigned them.
CONCLUSION
This Article offers a comprehensive study of the Fed’s power to
suspend, remove, and prohibit officers, directors, employees, investors,
and other persons involved with bank holding companies and their bank
312
Cf. Langevoort, supra note 238, at 150 (noting that “even if a conviction is obtained and
sustained, the deterrence effect . . . is undermined as other executives see how many others
are walking away free”).
313
Menand, supra note 16, at 1567 (quoting Testimony Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptrollor of
the Currency, Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on
Banking & Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 3 (1995), https://www.occ.treas.gov/newsissuances/congressional-testimony/1995/pub-test-1995-133-written.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
AM64-TENV]).
314
International Lending Supervision Act, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908(a)(1)(2), 97 Stat. 1153,
1280 (1983) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2)).
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and non-bank subsidiaries. It identifies the origins of the power in the
wake of a series of late nineteenth century bank failures and traces its
evolution in the U.S. Code from the Great Depression to the present day.
It argues that Congress created the power so that the Fed could hold
executives responsible to the public. And it reveals that the Fed now uses
the removal power mostly to prevent already-terminated, low-level
employees who committed crimes from working at other banks, even
though Congress never intended for removal to be used primarily in this
way.
This Article argues that this shift is problematic to the extent it creates
an impression among bank executives that the government will not use
removal against them. A credible threat of removal for failing to supervise
bank employees is an indispensable component of modern bank
supervision, filling gaps left by regulatory rules and corporate governance
measures. Accordingly, this Article argues that the Fed should change its
approach to removal to make actions against executives easier and that
Congress should amend the statute to do the same. A workable removal
power is needed to safeguard the public interest in safe and sound banking
by constraining the discretion of private shareholders and their appointed
executives in managing the operations of banks.

